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ABSTRACT 
The current published research on authoritarianism and morality has used the DIT 
in an overly simplistic manner to predict opinions and actions within the dual process 
model, using principled moral development (P) as a continuous variable only without 
examining the influence of schema structure on authoritarianism, and vice versa 
(McFarland, 2010a). While using P as a continuous variable is advised in most research 
cases, the scale developers recommend using schema measures when examining the 
relationship of the DIT to other judgment measures (Thoma, 2006).  By interpreting 
moral development and decision making as a linear construct rather than as a set of 
interlocking schema, this reductionism likely muddled the connection between Duckitt’s 
Dual Process Model and moral development, creating a simple model that mediated 
authoritarianism through P to predict prejudice (McFarland, 2010a). 
By examining the relationship between moral reasoning schemas and 
authoritarianism while controlling these factors, a much more complex model for  
meaningfully explaining how moral reasoning fits into Duckitt’s theories and 
McFarland’s research was found involving both moral reasoning level and the gender of 
the subject, ultimately supporting separate models for the genders. The research was also 
an extension of the validity studies for the moral schema views mentioned previously by 
Thoma and others, determining the applicability of schema theory to Duckitt’s model 
(Duckitt, 2001; McFarland, 2010a; Rest et al., 2000; Thoma, 2006). 
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 “I could never find two people who are perfectly equal: one will always be more 
valuable than the other. And many people, as a matter of fact, simply have no value.”  
― Pentti Linkola, Can Life Prevail? 
 
“Nice customs curtsy to great kings.”  
― William Shakespeare, Henry V 
Introduction 
Authority has played a critical role in human history-from a certain perspective 
humanity can be divided into rulers and the ruled, and the differences between them. But 
if this perspective is taken, one finds that there are in fact a number of things they share 
in common.  This particular cluster of cognitive and behavioral traits is often identified in 
social psychology as belonging to an authoritarian personality. The term personality is a 
misnomer. The majority of current researchers view authoritarianism as a set of beliefs 
and styles of thinking and behaving that are distinct from personality, and not linked to 
any one type of personality. Individuals exhibiting such traits (rigidity, high resistance to 
change) tend to align into certain groups, hold certain opinions in common, and generally 
conduct themselves in a particular manner that results in a strong connection between 
thought and behavior-not so much a personological characteristic as a way of thinking.
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So if the individual characteristics that make up the construct of authoritarianism 
are implicit in certain opinions, the logical question is why. One strong possibility is that 
the effects of authoritarianism are mediated by a more global cognitive model regarding 
how such individuals relate to others in their environment, particularly in regard to open 
ended issues that do not have a clear answer.  
Less flexibility with styles and patterns of thinking, such as using inflexible rules 
rather than active reasoning, does not lend itself well to certain modes of thinking. Those 
who utilize more absolute or ‘conventional’ methods of reasoning to define the proper 
relationship between individuals often do not succeed in this regard. These judgments 
about the moral relationship between individuals constitute a major part of human 
interactions, which are in turn an absolutely important part of healthy mental functioning. 
Individuals who score low on measures of moral reasoning (and logical reasoning 
inventories in general) are less likely to learn new material, ideas, or ways of interacting 
with others without in depth and effortful work (Thoma, 2006).  Establishing a 
connection between these two elements, authoritarianism and ‘conventional’ moral 
reasoning, will provide a model of mediation for the effects observed in research 
regarding authoritarian individuals. In effect, individuals who score high on measures of 
authoritarian thought are likely to utilize conventional methods of ethical/moral 
reasoning, making them less amenable to change, challenging of rules or deviation from 
tradition.  
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Therefore, there are two particular factors which are of interest in this study. The 
degree to which individuals embrace aspects of authoritarianism-for this study defined 
using Duckitt’s Dual Process Model-and how this may predict the complexity and fixed 
patterns of reasoning used in their ethical and moral reasoning (Duckitt, 2001). By 
reviewing the connections already established between authoritarianism and moral 
reasoning, as well as by seeking a more accurate interpretation of these findings, a clearer 
understanding of this relationship will be outlined. It is believed that measures of 
authoritarianism should strongly predict membership in a conventional, static moral 
reasoning style on one of the most common inventories for moral and ethical reasoning, 
the Defining Issues Test (McFarland, 2010a).  
Authoritarianism 
 Authoritarianism, as it is commonly understood, is a form of political 
organization characterized by an extreme concentration of political franchise within a 
very small stratum of the overall population who exclude all other political opponents 
from free competition (Shepard & Greene, 2007). While a helpful structural definition, it 
fails to describe the reasons why a population would subscribe to such a model of 
government. The attempts to determine the answer to this question span more than half a 
century, and have stepped in and out of different disciplines in the field of psychology 
along the way. In other disciplines, the difference between ‘authoritarianism’ and other 
political systems that exclude the bulk of a population from decision making (i.e. 
totalitarianism), focuses on the legitimancy of the role of the ruling individual or party, 
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with a strictly authoritarian government lacking legitimacy and ruling by imposed control 
and force (Sondrol, 2009). As will be discussed further on, research in psychology has 
integrated the ‘imposition of power’ and ‘acceptance of order’ into a more combined 
model, blurring the dichotomy into a spectrum based on two factors-the measures used in 
this study. 
There have traditionally been two different schools of thought underlying research 
into authoritarian individuals: a situational, social dynamic perspective, of which 
Milgram’s famous compliance studies are representative (Milgram, 1963); and a more 
steady, personality trait based model assuming individual differences in participants and 
the population. Research into situational effects of compliance and response to authority 
have run the gambit from impelling participants to “harm” other human beings to 
generating a more global tendency to accept socially normative responses as more valid 
than their own previous opinions (Milgram,1963; Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif 
1961). While interesting, these situational effects where just that: situational. They did 
little to explain the within groups difference in behaviors demonstrated by certain 
participants. While large scale social influences can and do modify behavior and make 
conformity more likely, the relatively high ‘noise’ in such experiments and the effects of 
self-categorization on the presentation of authoritarian behavior argues for the need for an 
individual differences perspective to be incorporated into any model of authoritarian 
behavior. Conversely, the more global, descriptive summaries provided in other literature 
are helpful only so far as to aid one in conceptualizing authoritarianism as it exists in a 
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real world expression-the measure of internalized constructs is simply beyond its 
purview.  
The first concerted effort to measure and define the authoritarian behavior 
clinically was the result of work by Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford 
(1950), who attempted to apply psychoanalytic theory to the behavioral archetype they 
saw present in fascist groups during World War II. Operating along much the same vein 
as Milgram’s compliance studies, Adorno and colleagues sought a framework with which 
to explain the extreme behaviors exhibited by military and civilian personnel during the 
conflict. It was the working assumption that harsh, restrictive parenting style with low 
fatherly affection would result in a pathogenormic personality which gravitated towards 
dictatorial leadership.  The F (facism) scale (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & 
Sanford, 1950) was the result of this effort; the test was composed of indirect questions 
designed to assess a set of nine personality tendencies: conventionalism, authoritarian 
submission, authoritarian aggression, anti-intraception, superstition and stereotype, power 
and toughness, destructiveness and cynicism, projectivity, and sex (attitude towards).  
The scale had a number of serious problems associated with it, including its lack 
of empirical validation. Many of the “tendencies” measured were done so indirectly due 
to their psychodynamic basis. Viewed from such a perspective, many of the outlined 
traits consisted of inferred subconscious processes which, by their very nature, could not 
be directly measured.  As such, stand in questions were utilized to probe past the 
“conscious resistance” of participants, which had low validity and reliability (Cohn, 
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1952). Likewise, the scale also varied according to participants’ intellectual capacity, 
SES, and political orientation (Kelman & Barclay, 1964). While the scale was later 
revised (the Balanced F Scale, or F scale revised) to correct for some of these 
psychometric errors, the criticisms launched against the instrument rendered it untenable 
(Turner, Brown, & Tajfel, 1979). This lack of reliability led to the individual differences 
perspective of authoritarianism being neglected for roughly twenty years (Duckitt, 
Wagner, du Plessis, & Birum, 2002). The scale would later be entirely scrapped and 
replaced by a more empirically validated system of measurement.  
Current models of authoritarianism. The contemporary view of authoritarian 
theory utilizes two linked constructs to explain the diversity of behaviors that fall under 
the purview of authoritarian behavior: authoritarian submission and authoritarian 
dominance. Based on the theoretical framework established by Duckitt’s (1989) 
conception of authoritarianism, the concept of an overarching ‘personality of 
authoritarianism’ has been set aside as the “fruitless search for correlations between intra- 
and interpersonal phenomena” (Duckitt, 1989, p. 63). A more empirically productive 
view of authoritarian behavior is one of a cognitive set that is the product of social 
behaviors, individual traits, and situational variables which produce an internal system 
wherein pressures for cohesion and support for existing structure in society combine to 
create a steady system of political relationships that is not dependent on a pathogenic 
personality (Duckitt, 1992). Effectively, all of the above (interpersonal social effects, 
personality traits, previous experiences) feed into two separate factors that are then 
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directly related to social opinions and actions that are authoritarian in bent: a submissive, 
conforming factor and an aggressive, domineering factor. The relationship between the 
original factors, like personal experiences or personality traits, and authoritarian behavior 
is fully or significantly moderated by these “super factors” (Duckitt, 2001).  
 In hindsight, the search for a personality variable or trait which would be shared 
by enough individuals to constitute a political bloc was somewhat facetious. The view of 
authoritarian behavior springing from fixed (but not petrified) patterns of thought, rather 
than as absolute and embedded traits, simply makes more sense. After all, there is 
tremendous variation in the personality of most world dictators and those who actively 
support the government of such individuals, so it would seem odd for them all to possess 
some underlying trait which made them authoritarian (Carius, 2003).  
There are two identified cognitive sets that underline authoritarian behavior, 
classified by shared desire for strong preference for social hierarchy and powerful 
centralized political structures, which were organized along two dimensions-a 
conservative/submissive dimension and a dominant/power motive dimension (Sibley & 
Duckitt, 2008). The conservative/submissive dimension outlined in research is linked to 
classical political conservatism, traditionalism, fear/threat of others, and restriction of 
behaviors and personal freedoms for the sake of continuity (Duckitt, Bizumic, Krauss, & 
Heled, 2010). Similarly, the dominant/power motive dimension strongly correlates with 
power seeking, toughmindedness, desire for status, low concern for social welfare, 
Micavilleiansim, and competitiveness (Duckitt & Fisher, 2003; Jugert & Duckitt, 2009; 
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Sibley, Harding, Perry Asbrock, & Duckitt, 2010). The common clusters of beliefs which 
constituted these dimensions folded surprisingly well into these categories (Feldman & 
Stenner, 1997). Both of these constructs are linked insofar as they explain the relationship 
of individuals to strongly asymmetric power structures in society. However, the manner 
in which they relate to this structure is different. 
 The conservative/submissive factor is built around content that indicates a desire 
to avoid competition by maintaining norms, while the dominant/power motive factor 
aims to use the asymmetric power structure to gain the upper hand in such conflicts.  
Such structures create the norms that conventionalist thinkers seek to maintain, and the 
support of such structures likewise protects the hierarchy they create. As these clusters of 
opinion and behavior match so well with two preexisting models of authoritarian 
behavior, much research subsequent to Duckitt’s seminal paper have adopted these 
models to represent the two clusters: Right Wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance 
Orientation. 
Right wing authoritarianism. The current model of Right Wing 
Authoritarianism (RWA) is a construct proposed by Altemeyer (1998) to explain 
conventionalistic and conformitive behavior among certain individuals. Conventionalists 
tend to support and maintain current patterns of doing things, from interpersonal behavior 
up to law making. Conformative individuals are more likely to mimic or copy the 
behavior and actions of others. When applied to behavior as a whole these assumptions 
effectively amount to authoritarian submission to whatever ideal or power structure 
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currently holds sway by encouraging conformity to current norms and the maintenance of 
those norms. The title ‘right wing authoritarianism’ should not be misattributed to mean 
that the RWA scale is also a measure of political conservatism, only submission to 
current authorities (Sibley & Duckitt, 2008). Soviet citizens during the height of the cold 
war scored in a near identical manner on the scale as US citizens during the same era 
(Altemeyer, 1996; McFarland, Ageyev, & Abalakina-Paap, 1992). Soviet citizens were 
just as likely to maintain norms and conform to ‘the government line’ as their democratic 
counterparts. High scorers are more likely to accept authority, prefer strongly organized 
government, and the rule of law. Interestingly this ‘absolutism of the law’ is not universal 
in its application; RWA individuals are often lenient in enforcing the rules of society on 
those in authority when those violations of rules take place against individuals who 
threaten social and legal norms (Altemeyer, 1998; Sibley & Duckitt, 2010). It has been 
demonstrated, for example, that individuals who score high on RWA tests are more likely 
to support police who have broken procedure in handling criminals (Altemeyer, 1981, 
Feather, 1998, 1999). 
Altemeyer (1981) developed the construct as a result of dissatisfaction with 
Adorno et al.’s (1950) psychodymanic model of authoritarian behavior and, by stripping 
out all variables that could not be empirically tested (as well as those that did not bear up 
under scientific scrutiny) arrived at a three factor structure for authoritarian behavior: 
Conventionalism (the tendency to maintain norms), Authoritarian Aggression (reaction 
against those who are perceived to threaten norms), and Authoritarian Submission 
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(wholesale acceptance of leadership). Altemeyer (1988) further stated that individuals 
who score high on the RWA scale are likely to fear outside influences both politically 
and in general, grant unreasonable latitude to properly elected authorities (Submission), 
and tend to conform to a greater degree to punitive group and legal norms (Conformity) 
than a normal population sample. However, recent factor analysis on larger and better 
stratified samples have reaffirmed the older three factor model (Funke, 2005; Mavor, 
Louis, & Sibley, 2010). Regardless of factor structure, the test nonetheless is a fit to the 
conservative/submissive construct outlined in Duckitt’s original article (1989). 
Social dominance orientation. While the Altemeyer theory (1981) certainly 
provides a meaningful definition for submission to authority, it does not fit the behavior 
or motivations for the type of individuals who often fall into the higher positions of an 
authoritarian system, who commonly are not conforming, norm obeying, or submissive 
(Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). In an attempt to remedy this, Pratto 
attempted to create a construct that captured what elements of behavior and cognition that 
are related strongly to ‘authoritarian dominators’, those who tended to gravitate towards 
hierarchical authoritarian structures and use them to acquire power by maintaining or 
enhancing the status differences between individuals. The finalized scale, Social 
Dominance Orientation (SDO), measures the tendency of individuals to seek out and 
support the creation of unequal group hierarchies in society, with their own affiliate 
groups at or near the top (Sidanius & Pratto, 2001). High SDO scorers create and cling to 
justifying myths to explain and rationalize the existence and maintenance of unequal 
11 
 
 
 
distributions of power that sustain current the current social order (Sindinus & Pratto, 
1993). For high scorers on the SDO, these myths are not isolated prejudices towards 
particular groups, but rather reflect a global processing of social information (Sibley & 
Liu, 2010). 
  This definition differs from the RWA in that whereas right wing authoritarianism 
is a tendency to seek stability and safety through conformity and regimented social 
hierarchies, SDO represents the desire to use those hierarches for personal benefit, with 
less concern about intangible factors. Social Dominance oriented individuals often do not 
care as much for ‘soft’ threats to power such as the presence of unacculturated foreigners, 
multicultural societies, etc; but are very apprehensive about any of those groups 
advancing in economic status (Duckitt, 2006; Sidanius, 1993). Because the questions on 
the form are phrased as indicating how society ‘should be’ rather than how it is, this need 
not reflect actual group differences in society wide power, only the desire for such an 
arrangement (Sidanius, Levin, Federico, & Pratto, 2001). Furthermore, questions are 
designed to allow the participant to assume that their group is dominant. For example, a 
sample question from the SDO reads, “Some groups of people are simply not the equals 
of others”, Both presently empowered and disenfranchised groups can self-identify as 
superior, and agree to this statement wholeheartedly by implicitly inserting “my group” 
into the question (Verkuyten & Hagendoorn, 1998).  While this statement runs counter to 
the original claims by Sidanius and Pratto (1993), who believed that only the dominant 
group in a particular social arrangement should demonstrate elevated scores, what limited 
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research that has been conducted on non-dominant groups shows that bigoted 
opportunists are, at least according to scores on the SDO, evenly distributed across 
ethnicity and SES (Goodwin, Operario, & Fiske, 1998; Son Hing, Bobocel, Zanna, & 
McBride, 2007). 
Multiple studies since the mid-nineties have borne up social dominance theory 
demonstrating its efficacy in predicting attitudes about public policy, wherein high SDO 
scorers significantly favored reducing hierarchy attenuating welfare funding (Pratto et 
al.,1994; Sidanius, van Larr, Levin, & Sinclar, 2003). Other examples for high SDO 
scorers include concomitantly high scores on inventories of prejudice (Sidanius, Pratto, & 
Bobo, 1996), and voting down women’s rights legislation-even among women (Sibley, 
Robertson, & Wilson, 2006), which are all hierarchy enhancing behaviors. The scale is 
consistent across time as well, with ratings of SDO accounting for these differences 
longitudinally (Sibley & Duckitt, 2010). Again, SDO adequately summarizes all the 
related opinions and behaviors of the dominant/power motive group identified earlier 
(Duckitt, 1989). 
Interrelation of the scales. SDO and RWA, while closely related, are separate 
and additive constructs of an underlying cognitive schema for decision making (Duckitt, 
2009; Duckitt et al., 2002). While there is a meaningful overlap in scores when the 
inventories are administered concurrently, each appears to measure statistically distinct 
aspects of individuals functioning. As such, the constructs have a Pearson Product 
Movement of .18-.23, a mild correlation (Duckitt et al., 2002; Sibley et al., 2006). 
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Further, they show discriminant correlations with such factors as honesty and humility, 
which is positively correlated to RWA but negatively correlated to SDO (Sibley et al., 
2010). Likewise, when examined using Big Five personality inventories, high SDO is 
correlated with low Agreeableness and elevated Extroversion, and RWA with high 
Conscientiousness and low Openness to New Experiences (Jugert & Duckitt, 2009; 
Sibley & Duckitt, 2009). The ‘personality profile’ of these two scales is not, therefore, 
entirely opposed. The use of personality to define authoritarianism should be tempered 
with the knowledge that these correlations with fixed traits are of a much lower 
magnitude than those between RWA/SDO and social opinions, and the Big Five and 
other personality measures correlate poorly to most social opinion measures (McFarland, 
2010b; Sibley, Harding, Perry, Asbrock, & Duckitt, 2010; Sibley & Liu, 2010). No one 
established personality trait is so dominant a predictor as to be covariate with either scale 
or even tentatively dictate subscription to authoritarian thought. To state it simply, SDO 
and RWA are commonly used as rough approximations of ‘leader’ (SDO) and ‘follower’ 
(RWA) archetypes in authoritarian research, but the thought patterns they represent can 
both present in any kind of individual without being too bizarre an occurrence.  
As stated previously, while both relate to and seek to maintain a strong, central 
authority, they do so for different reasons-security and conservation of roles for high 
RWA scorers, and increased competitive success and advancement for high SDO scorers 
(Thomsen, Green, & Sidanius, 2008). From this perspective, they also share a number of 
curious characteristics in common, statistically. They predict racially prejudiced attitudes 
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better when used together in regression than they do independently; they are likewise 
effective in predicting homophobic, sexist, and ethnically discriminatory attitudes (Cohrs, 
Moschner, Maes, & Kielmann, 2005; Sibley et al., 2006). This is due to the lack of 
covariate overlap, as both RWA and SDO add useful information independently. Finally, 
the effects of SDO and RWA are not consistent over all situations-they explain different 
amounts of variance for opinions when making judgments about different kinds of out 
groups, either threatening or competitive (Duckitt & Sibley, 2007, 2010b; Duckitt et al., 
2002; Thomsen et al., 2008).The loading for each type of discriminant group varies by 
“type.”  ‘Dangerous groups’ are more strongly accounted for by RWA, and ‘degraded or 
competitive’ groups by SDO (Duckitt, 2006; Duckitt & Sibley, 2010a, 2010c; Kreindler, 
2005). 
This difference bares further discussion. RWA, as a measure of conservation and 
fear of exterior threat, predicts negative reactions to those ‘others’ or situations which 
threaten established mores (Duckitt, 2006). This is why RWA is a stronger predictor for 
anti-gay affect than classical racism among individuals who report to be Christians 
(Goodman & Moradi, 2008; Hall, Matz, & Wood, 2010). The tenets of many forms of 
Christianity are profoundly hierarchy attenuating placing all humans regardless of race 
into one category, except for those identified as being sinners-e.g., gay or lesbian 
individuals (Wojtyla, 2000). As RWA is strongly influenced by submission to authority, 
particularly the clergy in this case, discrimination against such groups logically would be 
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and is in fact impacted, though the effects have not been universally conclusive (Mavor, 
Louis, & Laythe, 2011; Mavor, Macleod, Boal, & Louis, 2009; Wilton, 2005).  
It bears noting that RWA shows an interesting pattern of effects that is not 
observed with SDO in relation to prejudice or aggression. As one of the strongest 
predictive factors for RWA is norm conformity, it is no great leap to assume that 
aggression, discrimination, and other socially reprehensible sentiments ought to be 
suppressed in high RWA individuals. Duckitt, Wagner, du Plessis, and Birum (2002) 
used SEM to test this theory using several large, multinational samples and discovered 
that the direct effect of norm conformity (a significant, negative relationship to 
expressions of prejudice) was almost perfectly counterbalanced by the mediated, and 
positive, effects through RWA. The result was a net-zero model: effectively, the reactive 
characteristics of norm conformity were canceled out or reduced to non-significance by 
the mediated relationship passing through RWA (Mavor et al., 2009).  
Interestingly, no comparable relationship exists for SDO-that is, there is no latent 
variable ‘behind’ Social Dominance which has direct effects on classical authoritarian 
behaviors once SDO is factored in. SDO, conversely, does not necessarily demonstrate 
this same pattern (Sidanius, Mitchell, Haley, & Navarrete, 2006). For high SDO scorers, 
groups that are inferior or close to one’s own personal position in power will be viewed 
more negatively, regardless of the threat that may be posed to the social order-the 
“degraded/competitive’ groups mentioned above (Duckitt, 2006; Kreindler, 2005; Levin 
& Sidanius, 1999). While manipulating the presentation of an imaginary surge in the 
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immigration of a particular population (Sardinians) into New Zealand, groups of high 
SDO scorers were more opposed to immigration when the Sardinians were described as 
affluent, educated, and likely to directly compete for jobs than when they were described 
as poor refugees unlikely to compete for employment (Duckitt, 2006). Similar results 
have been found in other experiments (Duckitt & Farre, 1994; Duckitt & Sibley, 2010a; 
McFarland, 1998 Sibley & Liu, 2010).  
 Regardless, in most cases, when either construct predicts exclusion of a group 
they both will. This finding is tempered by the fact that while both SDO and RWA may 
be predictive of a particular behavior, the degree to which they do follows the patterns 
outlined above. That is, the two constructs show different degrees of predictive power for 
different groups, and the degree to which they account for variance is independent of one 
another (Alteymer, 1998; Feather, 1999; Sibley & Duckitt, 2008). Thus, though the two 
operate in conjunction, they must still be understood as separate constructs which account 
for differing patterns of behavior and thought. This is particularly obvious when one 
examines the differences between the two scales. 
Scale differences. Both SDO and RWA scores vary as a result of gender 
differences (Pratto, Stallworth, & Sidanius, 1997). These differences are not accounted 
for by the other common factors such as education and age, both of which reduce scores 
on the scales (Sidanius, Sinclar, & Pratto, 2006). As of current, this gender difference 
remains relatively unexplained. The reasons for the decrease by gender (females score 2.2 
points lower on the SDO and 3.1 lower on the RWA, a significant difference), are hotly 
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contested with some claiming evolutionary causes for gender, and others assuming a 
model of socialization that favors hierarchy attenuating roles for women (Pratto, et al., 
1997; Sibley et al., 2006; Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1994). A leading assumption is that 
males have historically benefited more from a strong social hierarchy, which allowed 
them better access to resources (SDO) and reduced the need for constant violent 
competition for status (RWA), thus propagating the behavior or ‘masculinizing’ it (Levin, 
Federico, Sidanius, & Rabinowitz., 2002). Likewise, many hierarchy attenuating (and 
therefore antiauthoritarian) roles in society such as charity sponsorship and children’s 
education have been canonically dominated by females, creating a bias for women 
against authoritarianism (Schmid Mast, 2002). Finally, ratings of empathy may serve as a 
mediator for females, with greater levels of empathy reducing the psychological distance 
between the individual one is judging and oneself (Sidanius et al.,1994).  
Education is the center of a similar debate as gender. Does pursuing higher 
education naturally select for individuals who score lower on scales of authoritarianism 
(Rubin & Hewstone, 2004)? Research indicates that SDO scores decline for all 
individuals who receive post-secondary education, devaluating this argument (Sidanius et 
al., 2006a).  Likewise, for high RWA scorers, increased exposure to education may 
increase ability to identify when a situation/group is nonthreatening, effectively 
equipping an individual to socialize without the need of authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 
2002). Scores on the SDO may decline as a result of acquiring new methods of personal 
success that do not rely on group identification (Levin et al., 2002). In effect, education 
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may provide superior methods of satisfying needs and wants than utilizing group 
dynamics. What has been established is that gender and education do not interact 
significantly (Sidanius, van Larr, Levin, & Sinclar, 2003). 
Age is also an important factor in scores on both of these variables. Both RWA and SDO 
decline with age (Altemeyer, 1996; Duckitt & Sibley, 2010c). It is assumed that age 
moderates the fear component of the RWA, as individuals are exposed to more real world 
experiences and build up a “reserve of real world experience to replace false beliefs” 
(Altemeyer, 1996, p. 114), and that SDO decreases as a result of lowered need to achieve 
(Duckitt & Sibley, 2010c). An example of this decrease in action may be useful for 
explaining this effect. Individuals who score high on the RWA and SDO tend to support 
harsher punishments for criminals (Carrol, Perkowitz, Lurigio, & Weaver, 1987; Feather, 
1999; King & Maruna, 2009;). However it has also been shown that as participant’s age, 
their endorsement of harsh punishments for criminal behavior declines, as does their 
threat assessment of ‘abnormal’ groups (Feather, 1998; Narby, Cutler, & Moran, 1993). 
Likewise, ratings of authoritarianism are shown to decline throughout an individual’s life 
time due to basic changes in ratings of aggression (Sidanius et al., 2006). 
Origins of authoritarianism. In examining the listed definitions of SDO and 
RWA, it becomes obvious that such individuals rather naturally gravitate towards 
mutually fulfilling roles (RWA individuals “following”, SDO individuals “leading”), and 
these roles are transmittable intergenerationally (Altemeyer, 1988; Peterson & Duncan, 
1999; Vollebergh, Iedema, & Raaijmakers, 2001). According to the original theory, 
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individuals acquire the core traits of authoritarian personality through conscious 
modeling of parents or role models. Interestingly, the commonly explored methods of 
transmission such as parenting style and extrinsic orientation of motivation (Duriez, 
Soenens, & Vansteenkiste, 2007; Soenens et al., 2008) appear to indicate that high RWA 
parents often produce children with elevated SDO scores, and the inverse is also true. 
While strong connections between scores of parents and children on the RWA are easily 
explained by mediating child rearing processes (authoritarian parental style), SDO 
scoring appears to be more strongly influenced by individual goal orientation (Duriez & 
Van Hiel, 2002; Soenens, Luyckx, Vansteenkiste, Duriez, & Goossens, 2008). Even as 
children, orientation towards extrinsic motivators (what can I get out of this situation?) 
better predicts SDO scores than other factors (Duriez et al., 2007). 
In examining the information above regarding scale differences and interactions 
both across other variables as well as intergenerationally, several things become clear. 
The degree to which the two constructs are separate appears to be more related to both 
the context of a situation and personally held opinions than any fixed factor, further 
affirming the theory that both are linked constructs under the overarching scheme of 
authoritarian theory and not simply a personality type (Duriez, Van Heil, & Kossowska, 
2005; Schmitt, Branscombe, & Kappen, 2003; Kreindler, 2005). For example, many 
measures of individual ‘personality’ traits such as the Dangerous World Inventory and 
measures of Machiavellianism-which logically should relate to things like patriotism or 
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racism-are totally mediated by RWA and SDO when they are utilized as intervening steps 
in a model (Duckitt & Farre, 1994; Duckitt et al., 2002;).  
Both SDO and RWA have been found to correlate much better with social 
opinion measures than many validated measures of personality such as the five factor 
model, or measures of temperament and motivation (Duriez & Van Hiel, 2002; Heaven & 
Conners, 2001; Sibley & Duckitt, 2009). It is assumed based on the fit indices for 
structural equation models used that this is because personality adds only a small 
percentage of the variance when mediated through RWA and SDO. While correlated to 
certain personality types as discussed above, the effects of the measures of RWA and 
SDO supersede and subsume those for measures of personality. These findings have been 
used to explain why it has been hard to reproduce many studies that used personality 
inventories to predict social opinions: they were missing the mediating step in the model. 
Thus there is evidence to support the conclusion reached by Duckitt in his 2001 work that 
RWA and SDO are super factors that are predicted and effected by not just personality, 
but an agglomeration of traits, beliefs, and experiences of individuals, and which mediate 
the relationship between these underlying variables and actual authoritarian behavior 
(Duckitt, 2001, 2006).  Because of these differences and interactive effects, the two tests 
form a profitable two part model that is flexible enough to explain the phenomenon of 
authoritarianism, and can be used together to reliably assess all aspects of 
authoritarianism insofar as they relate to the individual. Therefore, the dual process 
model will be used to measure the degree of authoritarianism in participants. It is a 
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methodology that has been shown to be superior to other models or shotgun approaches 
(which often introduce extraneous noise data) for defining and identifying 
authoritarianism as a pure construct (Sibley & Duckitt, 2010). 
Moral Reasoning 
Defining the socially appropriate response to human interactions has historically 
been a science unto itself, commanding a third of the “trivium” of classical western 
education, as well as being the focus of many enlightenment thinkers (Tierney, 1992; 
Kant, 1964). Given its soft and relatively unquantifiable nature however it has been, in 
most cases, relegated to languish among the humanities and passed over in terms of 
scientific endeavor. This was particularly true in the middle of the 20th century in the 
field of psychology, which was at the time deeply steeped in behaviorist theory. It was 
during this time that Lawrence Kohlberg first proposed both the value of studying moral 
development, as well as a systematic method of classifying it (Kohlberg, 1958). Inspired 
by previous work on child development by Piaget (1928, 1932), Kohlberg proposed a 
stage model for moral development. Piaget’s model of morality focused on the transition 
between Heterogeneous morality, characterized by inviolable rules and adult authority 
being paramount, and Autonomonous morality, which utilizes social reciprocity and 
views rules as flexible social constructions (Piaget, 1932). Kohlberg expanded on this 
model, utilizing these two stages as components in a broader stage theory.  
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 In Kohlberg’s model, individuals sequentially advanced through irreversible 
moral stages, ranging from total hedonism, to self-imposition of social values, to a 
universal application of justice theory. This advancement progressed from a reward and 
punishment perspective toward individual relationships and finally to oblique social 
concepts such a justice and individual rights (Kohlberg, 1981; Rest, Power, & Brabeck, 
1988). Each stage allowed for the contemplation and conclusion of more and more 
complex mental exercises. Effectively, the progression through stages represented the 
expansion of an operative system that allowed for more and more data to be 
constructively organized in a problem space (Kohlberg, 1976, 1981). In defense of his 
work, Kohlberg defined his theory as a model of cognitive behavior rather than ‘moral 
prerogative’. Each stage of reasoning was best conceived of as a more complex set of 
mental processes for determining the most efficacious manner to fit ethical demands to a 
situation (Levine, Kohlberg, & Hewer, 1985). In effect, Kohlberg’s stages of moral 
reasoning represented a progressively more complex collection of cognitive sets for 
solving problems, rather than a process explaining how people figure out how to do 
what’s right (Kohlberg, 1974). 
  While the theory provided a strong framework for defining moral development, it 
remained plagued with the initial issue that had relegated it to the fringes of scientific 
research. Most important, the process was tremendously difficult to objectively measure. 
Kohlberg himself relied almost entirely on lengthy, intensive interviews to collect his 
data, claiming that “([interviewing was]…theoretically the most valid method of scoring” 
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(Rest et al, 1999b, p. 295). However this method was not only time consuming, but at no 
point in Kohlberg’s personal research did his rating team ever achieve an interrater 
agreement of greater than .65 (Kohlberg, 1971, 1976; Colby & Kohlberg, 1987). 
According to Rest (1999a), it was not uncommon for the descriptions of moral reasoning 
to sound like textbook accounts of whatever stage of moral reasoning the interviewer, not 
the participant, was rooted in. For example, many of the participants scored by Kohlberg 
himself ended up sounding like philosopher John Rawls, whose deontological ethics 
formed the core of higher moral reasoning for Kohlberg (Harkness, Edwards, & Super, 
1981; Rawls, 1971; Thoma, Derryberry, & Narvaez, 2009). In order to explain the 
differences between Kohlberg’s and Rest’s conceptions of measuring morality, 
Kohlberg’s original theory should be examined. Originally, Kohlberg divided his 
cognition model into six stages which were seen as 1) each stage could provide a 
response to all possible moral dilemmas, 2) each stage had to be reached in order-no 
skipping, and 3) regression back to an earlier stage was extraordinarily rare (Kohlberg, 
1971; Levine et al., 1985; Walker, 1989). Each stage thus followed a generally sensible 
model of complexity and for Kohlberg, superiority. 
 The stages fit into three successive models that define how the stages relate to the 
concept of justice, Kohlberg’s golden standard of ethical decision making: these are Pre-
conventional (Stages 1 and 2), Conventional (Stages 3 and 4), and Post-Conventional 
(Stages 5 and 6), as well as a theoretical higher stage of universal morality which was not 
introduced into the model (Kohlberg, 1973). Each model encompasses a cardinal value 
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that is considered to be the most important piece of information when making a moral 
judgment. These range from the direct consequences of the action, to accepting social 
norms, as well as accepting individual rights and absolute principles as of paramount 
importance. The stages are as follows.  Stage one reflects animalistic hedonism, where 
right and wrong are defined by the providence of operant conditioning and rewards or 
punishments; Stage two is defined by what the individual gains by acting in true ‘self-
interest’ (Levine et al., 1985). Stage three and four focus on maintaining norms between 
individuals and society at large, respectively, whereas stages five and six focus on social 
contracts and universal rights in turn (Levine et al., 1985). 
A body of data does exist to support many of Kohlberg’s claims. Children do 
logically progress through the stages listed in his model when examined in large samples 
(Colby, Gibbs, Lieberman, & Kohlberg, 1983; Snarey, 1985). Likewise, individuals rate 
explanations that are considered stage five or six as more complex and sophisticated than 
explanations keyed to lower stage items (Boom, Brugman, & van der Heijden, 2001). 
However, the progression through stages is not nearly as clean cut as Kohlberg specified, 
as scores are rarely entirely at one level (Harkress et al., 1981; Rest & Narvaez, 1994). 
Further, cultural differences do impact scoring, with non-western cultures often being 
weighted towards stage three reasoning (Gibbs, Basinger, Grime, & Snarey, 2007; 
Kemmelmeier et al., 2003; Narvaez, Getz, Rest, & Thoma, 1999; Snarey, 1985; Walker, 
1989). 
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Defining issues test. Building from this foundation, the Defining Issues Test 
(DIT) is the attempt by James Rest and others to define and quantify moral reasoning in 
terms related to those of Lawrence Kohlberg’s original theory of moral development and 
reasoning while correcting for the difficulties in implementing valid measurements.  The 
key difference between Kohlberg and Rest’s methods is the use of completed choice 
banks from which participants select rationales for particular decisions (Rest, 1979). 
While the rationale for this decision has gone through several iterations, the current 
interpretation perspective of the DIT is the implicit assumption that it is designed to allow 
for recognition of cognitive processes, rather than relying on an individual to recall or 
expound the route their cognition took to arrive at the current conclusion. This was, 
according to Rest (1988), the critical weakness of Kohlberg’s method of assessment. 
Interviews allow for far too much subjective interpretation of data, and the majority of 
participants could not (and should not be expected to be able to) outline the structure 
involved in their reasoning in open problem spaces.  Interpreting responses separate from 
situational data was also problematic. By providing a series of preconstructed reasons, 
participants could engage in the much easier recognition task in selecting their reasoning, 
rather than attempt to recall what is often a “masked process” (Ericsson & Smith, 1991). 
Even experts (e.g., doctors, engineers) often have difficulty describing the line of 
reasoning which led to making correct decisions in their field. Further, one great 
difficulty of Kohlberg’s interviewing methods was due to the fact that moral judgment 
was (and remains by itself) a poor predictor of action (Rest et al., 1999a; Walker, 
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Gustafson, & Hennnig, 2001). Part of the reason behind this is that moral judgment-what 
the DIT aims to measure-is only part of four components used in moral functioning.  
Four component model. This four component model, introduced in the mid ‘80s, 
consists of three other factors-moral motivation, moral sensitivity, and moral character, in 
addition to judgment (Rest, 1986). These components are semantically similar to motive, 
perception, and disposition in making nominal, everyday decisions. One must perceive a 
problem, be in a position to do something about it, and be motivated to take action, in 
addition to being able to judge the proper course.  
The DIT focuses on moral judgment, the most cognitive component of this model 
(Beveau, 2002). Likewise, it accesses the lowest level of this component, the bedrock 
schema (Rest & Narvaez, 1994). This level is the basic ‘right and wrong’ heuristic of 
individual reasoning, which is overlaid with codes of conduct (Thou shall not kill) and 
broader truisms, such as beneficence, fidelity, and justice (Bebeau & Thoma, 1999). 
These overlaid levels of moral judgement that are too specific for the DIT to measure are 
currently out of direct reach of the DIT (Bebeau, 2002). Therefore, the DIT provides a 
broad view of the moral judgment of individuals, not specifics. This lends the DIT to 
measuring macromorality, or how justice should function in society wide, general terms, 
as the specifics of judgment, as well as the other three aspects of the four factor model, 
are not measured (Derryberry & Thoma, 2005; Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, & Thoma, 1999a).  
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Other factors, such as social stress and the availability of responses, exercise a 
large amount of influence on actual actions taken, even modifying judgment itself to 
match these expectations (Walker, 1995, 2004). This is why many adolescents who 
demonstrate exceptional altruism or prosocial behavior do not necessarily score highly on 
the DIT or other measures of moral development (Walker, 2004). What all this means is 
that the DIT is a solid instrument for judging dispositions and opinions, but not 
necessarily actions. The effects of macromorality on thought processes and perceptions of 
social cooperation instead grant the researcher a bird’s eye view of individual processing 
of moral/ethical data (Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, & Thoma, 1999b; Torney-Purta, 1990). By 
redefining what the DIT is intended to measure in light of newer models of moral 
functioning, the test remained a valid measure. Measuring individual tendencies on a 
global scale is the goal of this study; as such, the DIT is a very useful tool in this case. 
Schema theory. In a further step away from Kohlbergs theory, researchers have 
now embraced a schema model rather than a stage model, doing away with the concepts 
of irreversible stages and replacing them with a model based around social cognition 
theory (Rest et al., 1999b). In this way, Rest’s Neo-Kohlbergian model parallels the shift 
by Case and other researchers from Piaget’s original theory towards a perspective 
utilizing favored schemas and central conceptual structures (Case, 1998; Case & 
Okamoto, 1996).  This method of interpretation allows the older DIT to remain in line 
with the direction of its newer iteration, the DIT-2, without losing its validity. This new 
model modifies the original stage theory provided in Kohlberg’s theory significantly.  
28 
 
 
 
In the current conception, the individual differences of the stages are less 
important, and the model of Pre-Conventional, Conventional, and Post-Conventional 
schema are emphasized. It is proposed that rather than view many previously solely 
developmental concepts as progressions through levels of maturity, it may be fruitful to 
understand many cognitive phenomenon that do not have an identifiable organic base 
(changes in brain structure) as shifting sets of perception-akin to changes in software as 
well as hardware (Snyder & Feldman, 1984). This model is more an information 
processing theory of development than the original Piagetian theory, incorporating 
gradual and not irrevocable changes in schema usage. As such, moral judgment can be 
seen just as fruitfully as differing social schemas, rather than radical developmental 
changes. Each of these models or schemas may be used by any one individual at any 
time, just like any social cognition schema. For the majority, one may be dominant but 
not exclusive, and which schema is used may shift depending on the issue being 
addressed.  
This model allows for the findings with the original conception of the DIT that 
show moral stage development as progressing in an less linear pattern; it also explains 
why so few individuals reach stage six reasoning; much in the same way that few 
individuals achieve Piaget’s Formal Operations stage of development (Rest, Narvaez, 
Bebeau, & Thoma, 1999c). Historically, very few individuals achieved the scores 
required to qualify as belonging to stage six (Kohlberg, Boyd, & Levine, 1990; Power & 
Kohlberg, 1981). Further, the philosophical definitions Kohlberg relied upon, the 
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deontological theories of Rawls, are part of the embedded system of classical western 
postmodern thought that is increasingly considered inflexible and less applicable in a 
multicultural context (Bauchamp & Childress, 2008; Rawls, 1971). Likewise, the 
supposition that post conventional reasoning is “superior” to conventional reasoning, 
instead of being simply more complex, is now viewed as a major conceit in the larger 
clinical and medical community (Bauchamp & Childress, 2008). Others have stated that 
the Conventional stage of reasoning (Stage 4) requires just as great a degree of 
intellectual maturity to implement and contain within them the ideal of social reciprocity, 
and that many of the most colloquially recognized moral people in communities score 
firmly in Stage 4 (Van Vugt, Gibbs, Stams, Bijleveld, & Hendriks, 2010). 
 This is a particularly hot button issue as ones location on the conventional/post 
conventional divide correlates strongly with a large number of political sentiments, 
religiousness, and other social concerns which are very difficult to judge impartially 
(Marty & Appleby, 1993). In a schema rather than stage theory, this difference can be 
more easily explained as the result of other schemas fitting the situation better: baroque, 
complex morality simply does not usually get used to address many problems. Basically, 
each stage can be seen as representing only a limited cross-section of a larger body of 
problem solving solutions which do not apply universally, as they would have to in a 
stage theory.  
 As it is understood, schemas better fit the research data available, as well as 
satisfying the major aspects of Kohlberg’s original cognition model. Each schema (or 
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developmental type) represents a dominant pattern for organizing information on an 
issue. To explain it in a simpler fashion, schema theory takes an accounting of each of 
Kohlberg’s models (Pre-Conventional, Conventional, and Post-Conventional) and 
subsumes the original six stages within this system. The schemas are as follows. Pre-
conventional (S23), or the personal interests schema, is a system of reasoning which 
follows personal hedonism and a desire to maximize personal gain while minimizing 
loss. In this system there is no social morality, only a series of interpersonal commitments 
and attempts to contain losses (Rest et al., 1999a). Conventional (S4), or maintaining 
norms focuses on maintaining ones place in a stable hierarchy; it involves uniform and 
immutable law, stable, hierarchical role relationships that are inflexible and which, if they 
did not exist, would spell total collapse of society (Rest, et al., 1999a).  Post-conventional 
(S56), or post-conventional reasoning, focuses on social contracts and views laws as a 
means to an end rather than as a self-contained social idiom, which can be scrutinized and 
changed as needed by society. 
Each of these schemas has a consolidated and a transitional form, determined by 
how much the individual relies on each schema to make decisions, and how strongly they 
favor it (Walker, Gustafson, & Hennig, 2001; Walker & Taylor, 1991). It is theorized that 
just as children vacillate between different strategies and schemas for problem solving, 
even after they have successfully completed a task, individuals will move from more or 
less complex strategies when consolidating a new cognitive schema in general, 
effectively ‘feeling out’ new modes of cognition (Siegler, 2007). Each form has its own 
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unique characteristics that are measureable and stable across samples (Thoma, 2002). 
Consolidated scorers show significant differences between their highest schema score and 
the other two (Rest, Thoma, & Edwards, 1997). Transitional scores are more akin to a 
plurality score on a schema, without it being statistically different from the next lowest 
(Rest et al., 1997). In order to prevent difficulties in classification, a general cutoff of 
50% of total scores can be used to differentiate between transitional and consolidated 
scores (i.e, 51% or greater on any schema is considered consolidated on that schema), 
with the type of transitional schema being indicated by the second highest schema total-
the ‘off schema’ (Rest et al., 1997; Walker et al., 2001). Collectively, these transitional 
and consolidated schemas form seven different types, numbered one through seven, 
starting from consolidated S23 to consolidated S56, each forming a separate group.  
Table 1 
Schemas by type 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Pre-Conventional Schema      Conventional Schema     Post-Conventional Schema 
 Type 1           Type 2             Type 3         Type 4         Type 5          Type 6           Type 7 
   S23             S23*, S4          S23, S4*         S4           S4*, S56       S4, S56*           S56 
________________________________________________________________________ 
*  Indicates dominant Schema, with a score greater than the other listed, but below 50% 
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As discussed below, schemas illuminate many patterns in data that had been 
rather baffling under older conceptions of the Defining Issues Test. There is a large body 
of research to support the schema method of sorting data from the DIT over two decades, 
including the use of non-moral information forms, in classifying individuals by career, 
age, and other personal characteristics (Derryberry & Thoma, 2005; Maeda, Thoma, & 
Bebeau, 2009; Thoma, Barnett, Rest, & Narvarez, 1999; Walker & Taylor, 1991). The 
data collected (from thousands of forms filed at the Center for Moral Development) does 
appear to fit these categories better than the original 6 stage model (Rest, Narvaez, 
Thoma, & Bebeau, 2000). Meta-analysis of forms collected by the Center for Moral 
Development at the University of Alabama have indicated that individuals appear to, 
rather than progress gradually through the six stages of Kohlberg’s model, ‘pop’ between 
schemas, with more disorganized responding between stages three and four and four and 
five: the points where Rest divided the types of reasoning (Derryberry & Thoma, 2005).  
For example, a significant percentage of respondents, while fitting into the factor 
model above, showed pronounced variance to the degree that they formed their own 
stable subgroups (Walker, et al., 2001). These “unconsolidated responders” (types two, 
three, five, and six) showed greater variance between the three schemas: they also made 
more errors in filling out the forms (failing to select the highest rated items for the top 
three most important, etc), and endorsed “I don’t know” when asked to determine what 
should be done in a scenario, all of which is reflective of the difficulty of shifting from 
one cognitive schema to another (Rest et al, 1997; Thoma, 2002).  
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Likewise, individuals who had consolidated schema scores took significantly 
longer to complete the DIT, and fewer “can’t decides” (in all versions of the DIT, the 
participant can state that they cannot decide on a correct answer to the questions posed in 
the test): it is assumed that this is due to the greater access these individuals have to their 
underlying bedrock morality resulting in deeper processing of issues (Derryberry & 
Thoma, 2005). In looking at the research, the utility and explanatory power of schema 
theory is obvious: the observable changes in answering pattern according to the degree to 
which a participant aligns with a schema appears to indicate that the schemas are 
definitely separate constructs with notable boundaries that occur where they would 
intersect (transition vs. consolidated). Further, schemas have been used in research to 
demonstrate differences other concepts not directly related to morality: espoused political 
allegiance, latent political opinions, and other factors (Maedea, Thoma, & Bebeau, 2009; 
Thoma et al., 1999). They have even been used to predict religious orthodoxy, though 
with mixed results (Getz, Rest, & Thoma, 1999; Wilton, 2005). 
Criticisms. Beyond this, several criticisms have been directed at Kohlberg’s 
theory and thus at the DIT. Most prominent of these is Gilligan’s (1982) criticism of 
Kohlberg’s theory as sexist and biased towards an androcentric style of reasoning based 
off of male sample populations (Gilligan, 1982; Walker, 1995). Gilligan (1982) points 
out that in the original iteration of the DIT, females scored lower than males because 
women tended to focus on the interpersonal context of events, rather than on the 
principles alone which Kohlberg set out to measure. By Gilligan’s accounting, the DIT 
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was pejoratively constructed and did not accurately reflect the reasoning some of the 
population use. While extensively tested, many studies demonstrate marginal support for 
this hypothesis at best (Bebeau, 1994; Walker, 2006). The newer conception of the DIT, 
as well as the sample population for the DIT-2, correct many of these mistakes. Instead of 
viewing stages as a progression towards ‘better reasoning’, schemas which exist on a 
more or less equal playing field are used: that is, one is not innately superior to any other 
(Thoma, 2002). Finally, when using the schema system described below, gender 
differences become non-significant as stages two and three (where much of the gender 
differences were located) are combined (Rest et al., 1999b).  
 Other prominent criticisms include the conception that the test reflects political 
ideology rather than moral reasoning, measuring liberal tendency rather than moral 
development (Derryberry, Wilson, Snyder, Norman, & Barger, 2005; Sparks & Dirken, 
1987). A similar argument has been made concerning verbal ability levels, implicating 
that the DIT only really distinguishes between levels of reading skill and education 
(Emler & Tarry 2007; Sanders, Lubinski & Benbow, 1995). In relation to indicting the 
DIT as a politically biased instrument or measure of verbal ability alone, a series of 
studies demonstrated that when verbal scores and political affiliation were controlled for, 
the DIT still provided significant amounts of discriminant information about participants 
(Rest et al., 1999; Thoma, Derryberry, & Navraez, 2009). In fact, the concept that verbal 
intelligence effects scoring was soundly beaten and demonstrated to be an artifact of the 
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population on which the effect was originally demonstrated (Derryberry et al., 2005; 
Thoma, Narvaez, Rest, & Derryberry, 1999).  
Other claims include that its scenarios are biased against certain racial and 
cultural groups (Snarely, 1985), and finally, that the structured questions of the test are 
too far removed from everyday morality to measure any sort of valid construct (Killen & 
Hart, 1995). The replication of US scoring averages for the DIT in most European 
countries, China, and other nations across several studies conterindicates the first claim 
(Gibbs et al., 2007; Kemmelmeier et al., 2003). However, collectivist cultures do tend to 
score a greater percentage on stage 3, reflecting some degree of meaningful difference 
(Thoma, 1994). The last claim that the DIT, and Kohlbergs theory in general, do not 
represent adequately the day to day morality of life misses the point of the DIT. While 
there are measures of interpersonal, mundane morality available, the purpose of the DIT 
is to measure ‘macromorality’, or the manner in which the individual conceives of justice 
and proper arrangements between individuals (Rest et al., 2000). Given that the end goal 
is to discover not so much how individuals will react to a situation, but how they 
mentally process the information involved, the DIT remains a valid measure by all 
means. 
Moral Judgment and Authoritarianism 
What was of interest in this study was the fact that S4 reasoning is, descriptively, 
quite similar to the vernacular definitions of high scorers on the RWA and SDO, 
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respectively.  The emphasis on ‘law and order’ and ‘maintaining norms’ enspoused by S4 
reasoning are representative of two of the three common factors of RWA theory. The 
common factors for high scorers on the RWA (focus on maintaining absolute law, 
hierarchical roles, and deference to authorities for the purpose of smooth social 
functioning) are all part of the definition of the maintaining norms schema (Aletmeyer, 
1996; Rest et al., 1999c).  Authoritarian submission, in particular, fit with the classical 
definition of the maintaining norms schema, outlined above. 
Likewise, a focus on the self that was implied by S23 and S4 fit the definition of 
hierarchy enhancing SDO theory: emphasis on maintaining power differentials, socially 
condoned roles, as well as a focus on self-interested advancement (Pratto et al., 1994; 
Rest et al., 1999b). SDO includes a good deal of instrumental action against other parties 
for ones benefit, a potential nod to preconventional, self-serving reasoning. Early 
attempts at wedding RWA and the earlier stage model of the DIT were partially effective, 
though they have been eclipsed by later research utilizing the Dual Process Model as well 
as changes in interpretation of the DIT (Cockroft, 1996). Now, however, these forms 
should be comparable without the need to stretch their original purpose. This will allow 
the wedding of these measures without major issues. Because of this, predictive 
relationships should be found between authoritarianism and moral schema usage. 
Several experiments have already demonstrated the link between authoritarianism 
though a shotgun application of a large number of associated traits (Crockoft, 1996; 
Duckitt & Farre, 1994; McFarland & Mathews, 2005). Recently Duckitt’s Dual Process 
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Model and ratings of moral development on the DIT have been examined (McFarland, 
2010a). This study focused more on adding moral reasoning to Duckitt’s dual process 
model than the other studies which relied on the defuse method of scattershot forms, as 
they in general introduce a large chance for error and rarely add any predictive value 
outside the bounds of established theory (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009). By using correlations 
between items that are typically understood as descending from RWA or SDO to predict 
things, such experimental designs use things that have been established to be results of 
RWA  and SDO as predictors (Duckitt, 2001; Jurgen & Duckitt, 2009). In the series of 
studies by McFarland (2010a, 2010b), principled moral development, or P, was shown to 
serve as a mediating step between authoritarianism (SDO and RWA) and several opinion 
measures such as belief in human rights or generalized prejudice.  
There are several concerns about these findings, however. The current published 
research has used the DIT in an overly simplistic manner to predict opinions and actions 
within the dual process model, using principled moral development (P) as a continuous 
variable only without examining the influence of schema structure on authoritarianism, 
and vice versa. While using P as a continuous variable is advised in most research cases, 
the scale developers recommend using schema measures when examining the relationship 
of the DIT to nonmoral judgment measures (Thoma, 2006).  By interpreting moral 
development and decision making as a linear construct rather than as a set of interlocking 
schema, this reductionism likely muddled the connection between Duckitt’s Dual Process 
Model and moral development.  
38 
 
 
 
For example, McFarland found that principled moral development was only 
weakly negatively correlated with scores on measures of RWA and SDO, and accounted 
for only 21% and 11% of variance in scores, respectively (McFarland, 2010a). Several of 
the samples in fact failed to demonstrate a significant connection between SDO and 
principled moral development at all (McFarland, 2010a). While the reliability of scores 
using the DIT do likely account for some small percentage of this difference, this 
weakness is in greater part due to the fact that DIT scores of high authoritarian 
individuals likely fall into an undifferentiated middle range of scores on a continuous 
measure of principled moral development, thus creating a restricted range of scores 
which mask meaningful data. Thus, P is a measure that makes the overly wide 
discrimination between highly morally developed, post conventional thinkers, and 
everyone else; hardly the refined tool for detecting differences. This effect would likely 
have been exacerbated by the fact that there is no continuously significant difference 
between the hypothesized authoritarian S4 schema individuals and other S23 parties on 
ratings of P (Rest et al., 1999c). Therefore, the lower ends of P do not (and in previous 
research usage, cannot) differentiate between authoritarians and the simply morally 
underdeveloped. The scale used is not, from this perspective, a unidimensional measure 
of the increase of a single trait or skill, and using it as such is both methodologically and 
theoretically incorrect. 
 From this perspective, the use of P only provides reliable data on a part of the 
cogent factors involved in moral reasoning and authoritarianism, in much the same way 
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that Ebbinggaus’s early attempts to measure intelligence though memory only accessed a 
relatively minor portion of G, which is especially troubling since the predictions derived 
from this information about ‘intelligence’ were almost universally inaccurate (Sattler, 
2008).  In effect, P measures only a section of what authoritarianism is not, while 
comparing the conventional schema with the other schemas will measure all that 
authoritarianism is. A method of comparison between moral reasoning and measures of 
authoritarianism which parcels out the influence of not only Post-Conventional reasoning 
but also those schema which likely do align with authoritarianism could not but be vastly 
superior, if only by the weight of applicable data. Utilizing P allows a researcher to 
determine only that one schema of moral judgment is opposed to authoritarianism; using 
schemas collectively allows a researcher to see all of the relationship between the two. 
Effectively, while significant, this research by McFarland indicates that an overly 
simplified conception of moral cognition is ill suited to fully explain the connection 
between authoritarianism and moral development, let alone meaningfully utilize it as a 
mediating variable. Furthermore, the effects of age and education-both of which are 
strong predictors of scoring for all the variables in question, are not accounted for in 
McFarland’s model as specified by the test’s designers (Rest & Narvaez, 1994). 
Effectively, previous studies have ‘jumped the gun’ in adding moral reasoning to 
predictive models by failing to properly determine the relationship between Duckitt’s 
Dual Process Model and measures of moral reasoning.  
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The goal for this current research was to build off of the established connection 
between Duckitt’s Dual Process Model and DIT scoring in order to determine which 
moral schema is activated most often in high authoritarian individuals. The correlations 
found in previous research are mild, but significant at the .01 level, indicating that a 
relationship does exist between moral reasoning and measures of authoritarianism 
(McFarland, 2010a). The low alpha and weak correlations were, as discussed above, the 
result of poor methodological planning and a simplistic interpretation of moral reasoning 
as a continuous, undifferentiated progression. By instead utilizing the established schema 
perspective, an attempt was made to demonstrate that the connection between dual 
process authoritarianism is the result of particular schemas favoring the implied 
reasoning of RWA and SDO rather than the effect of some general moral deficit. 
Effectively, it was believed that it was not low scoring on the P measure of the DIT 
which was associated with authoritarianism, but rather use of very specific, conventional 
moral schemas that are not even directly measured by the index of P.  
Finally, all current research bypassed the clear and long noted effects that age and 
education have on the SDO, RWA, and DIT measures (Altemeyer, 1998; Pratto et al., 
1994; Rest & Navarez, 1994). Education drives up scores on the DIT, and conversely has 
a negative correlation with SDO and RWA, as does age. Of particular interest is the 
combined effect of education and changes in age, both of which are actively changing 
dimensions for this studies sample population. Changes in scoring on all of these 
inventories can be dramatic in the ages of 18-24 (Sindalus et al., 2006). By failing to 
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control for either of these effects, the true relationship between the variables was likely 
obscured. Adding this refinement was postulated to provide significantly better 
association between each set of predictors (RWA, SDO, and both combined) and moral 
reasoning. It was also intended to provide a model for better use of the DIT as an 
additional predictor in Dual Process Model. By examining the relationship between moral 
reasoning schemas and authoritarianism while controlling these factors, much stronger 
correlations were expected to be found. Seen from this perspective, this research was not 
only an effort to seek a meaningful model for explaining how moral reasoning fits into 
Duckitt’s theories and McFarland’s research: it was also an extension of the validity 
studies for the moral schema views mentioned previously by Thoma and others, 
determining the applicability of schema theory to Duckitt’s model (Duckitt, 2001; 
McFarland, 2010a; Rest et al., 2000; Thoma, 2006). 
To explain in detail, there are several core commonalities between the three 
concepts above, as well as their standard testing instruments. Both of the measures of 
authoritarianism selected, as well as the DIT, serve to measure macro level applications 
of the constructs they measure. That is, each form is concerned with how the participant 
applies the implied values of these measures to society in general rather than in 
ideographic fashion.  Each is designed to quantify cognitive processes, in the case of the 
SDO and RWA, a very specific one, whereas the DIT examines more global reasoning. 
As such, the forms used in testing are relatively compatible. 
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Even basic traits that feed into these measures have opposed effects: several 
personality traits (openness to new experience, etc) are correlated negatively with ratings 
of authoritarianism and positively with ratings of moral reasoning (Hart, Keller, 
Edelstein, & Hofmann,1998; Matsuba & Walker, 1998). Given the operant definitions for 
Rest et al.’s schema model (1999b), striking similarities can be drawn between S4 “Law 
and Order” processing and the definitions of RWA and SDO models. It was not too far a 
leap to assume that, as the majority of the components that feed into authoritarian models 
have to do with patterns of reasoning on ‘open space’ problems, the DIT should be 
particularly sensitive to the same core components that define RWA and SDO 
orientation. As such, one should be able to predict that individuals who score high on 
these scales will cluster around and utilize one particular schema-S4, while those who 
score highly on the SDO inventory should exhibit a profile on both S23 and S4 schemas, 
the design of achieving personal success at the expense of others should result in 
increased hedonism level scores.  
 Taking all of the above into account, further consideration was given to the more 
broad based effects of authoritarianism on individuals’ general reasoning processes. 
Duckitt (2002), as well as Sidinus (1999), had called for an extension of the Dual Process 
Model and its underlying factors into the realm of real behavior or scenarios, rather than 
just opinion polling. There are two important issues here: directionality and applicability. 
The first, directionality, was rather important. Is moral reasoning a latent variable which 
feeds into measures of authoritarianism, just like belief in a dangerous world or 
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hardmindedness, or is it an outcome that can be predicted by scores on the SDO and 
RWA? Given that the DIT is, effectively a measure that elicits opinions to newly 
generated experiences (participants ought to have never read the scenarios used in the 
DIT), it should be affected by latent variables like SDO and RWA, not the other way 
around. Research precedent also places them in this order. The second, applicability, was 
less of an obstacle. Because of the meaningful effects all scales have on a wide variety of 
opinions and motivations, the outcome of this research is both valuable and interesting, 
further outlining the bounds and connections between both constructs. Effectively, this 
experiment was ultimately designed to lay the groundwork for later efforts to demonstrate 
the mediation of SDO and RWA though other multidimensional constructs. In effect, 
rather than using a simple and crude measure of authoritarianism to predict opinions, it 
will be feasible to utilize the model begun with Mcfarland’s experimentation and refined 
herein to make more accurate assumptions.  
Hypotheses 
Hypothesis one. Ratings of P were expected to be negatively correlated with 
SDO and RWA.  
Hypothesis two. Scores on the SDO and RWA should allow for a reasonable 
disparity between moral reasoning schemas. SDO and RWA were positively correlated in 
previous work (~.17), but not greatly enough to be multicolinear (Duckitt & Sibley, 
2010b). Thus, they were used as effective predictor variables when determining if a 
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participant’s level of authoritarianism can predict what dominant moral schema they 
score highest in. It was expected that higher scores on both the SDO and RWA would 
predict elevated scores in both S4 and S23 schemas, with SDO predicting greater total 
variance for S23 and RWA having a similar effect on S4 schemas.  
Hypothesis three. It is established that men score higher than women on the SDO 
(Pratto et al., 1994, Pratto, Stallworth, & Sidanius, 1997; Sidainus, 1996, 2003). 
Likewise, men score 3-5 points higher on RWA than women, depending on the study 
(Altemeyer, 2006). The DIT, however, does not show a similar discrepancy in gender for 
scoring (Rest et al., 1997). This fact introduces some questions that must be addressed 
when interpreting the data from the above hypotheses. It is hypothesized that females’ 
moral reasoning schema will be less well predicted by authoritarian scales in general. 
This was done by repeating the above hypotheses using a split file process.   
Hypothesis four. It was expected that controlling for age differences would lead 
to stronger relationships between scores on the SDO and RWA in relationship to P, S4, 
and S23. In effect age was expected to act as a ‘noise suppressor’ for each of the items 
and increasing the derived r value. 
 Hypothesis five. There are several scenarios in the original DIT form which will 
invariably elicit certain responses by high scoring SDO and /or RWA participants. Three 
of the scenarios in the full version of the DIT possess a ‘sign stimuli’ for authoritarians, 
which were expected to result in near universal responses from those participants who 
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score in the upper range of the SDO and RWA-the Doctors Dilemma, the Mechanics 
Dilemma, and Heinz Dilemma. It was hypothesized that because the core content of these 
scenarios is a direct reflection of the threats most salient to high scorers on the 
authoritarian inventories, those who score high on them should universally indicate that 
they ‘do not approve’ of the content, marking the ‘no’ box for each scenario. Specifically, 
RWA individuals were expected to not endorse taking action in the Doctors Dilemma and 
the Heinz Dilemma, while SDO scorers were expected to not endorse hiring in the 
Mechanics Dilemma. 
Hypothesis six. The DIT scoring manual contains rules for scoring responses that 
fall under the category of “anarchy” (Rest, 1979). While not commonly utilized in current 
research, this index is described in terms that are opposed to the definition RWA, but do 
not significantly reference the semantic components of SDO. In effect, this “anarchy” (A) 
index was expected to provide a serendipitous tool for differentiating between high RWA 
individuals and high SDO individuals. It was hypothesized that scores on the A index of 
the DIT would be strongly inversely related with ratings of RWA across participants, 
while being mildly or not at all related to ratings of SDO.  
Method 
Participants 
In order to achieve the desired level of power indicated for two predictor variables 
(.85, α=.05, a medium effect size), a subject pool of approximately 197 participants was 
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assembled (Cohen, 1992). A convenience sample of Fort Hays State University students 
of general psychology was sufficient to satisfy the needs of the experiment. Of the 132 
valid responses, the sample consisted of 46 males and 86 females, average age 20.75 
(SD=4.5). Because the focus of this research was to identify widely applicable traits in 
young adult populations the use of a convenience sample was considered appropriate. 
The gender and ethnic composition of the sample was, as expected, weighted towards 
females, with a heavy preponderance of Caucasian participants in ratio to other reported 
ethnicities. While this may have limited the ecological validity of the study in a wider 
sense, the artificial homogeneity of the available population made initial interpretation of 
findings simpler. Participants were introductory psychology students at a Midwestern 
university who were offered extra credit for completing an online administration of the 
three test forms and demographic form.   
Measures 
The four measures that were used in assessing this research question were the 
Right Wing Authoritarianism Scale (Alemeyer, 1993), the Social Dominance Orientation 
Scale (Pratto et al., 1994), and the Defining Issues Test (Rest et al., 1986), as well as a 
simple demographic questionnaire. 
Right wing authoritarianism scale. The Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) 
Scale was a refinement of Adorno’s original F (Fascism) Scale (Adorno et al., 1950). The 
scale has been revised several times since its initial appearance in 1981, and consists of 
47 
 
 
 
22 seven point likert scale questions designed to measure the existence of the three traits 
that remained after initial screening: aggressive response style to threats, conformity 
seeking, and overly sensitive threat judgment (Altemeyer, 1996; Manganelli, Bobbio, & 
Canova, 2007). An example item that is keyed to all of these factors is item five: “It is 
always better to trust the judgment of the proper authorities in government and religion 
than to listen to the noisy rabble-rousers in our society who are trying to create doubt in 
people’s minds.” Participants rate each item in a range from 1) strongly disagree to 5) 
neutral to 9) strongly agree. Items are added to provide a total, which indicates the level 
of authoritarianism. Higher scores indicated a greater predilection towards authoritarian 
behavior. 
The Scale has high internal reliability (.87) and strong test-retest reliability (.83), 
making it a useful instrument for measuring authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1996). 
Likewise, it has been exhaustively tested since its initial debut on differing groups, ages, 
and cultures including Europe, Israel, and China (Altemeyer, 2006; Levin, Federico, 
Sidanius, & Rabinowitz, 2002; Rubinstein, 1996). The scale takes less than five minutes 
to complete. 
Social dominance orientation scale. The Social Dominance Orientation Scale 
(SDO) was constructed to assess the presence of “legitimizing myths” about the unequal 
distribution of resources in multigroup societies (Sidanius, 1993).  The test consists of 16 
seven point likert scale questions (ten of which are reverse scored to reduce the effects of 
response bias) which assess “the degree to which you (the participant) endorse this 
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statement” (Pratto et al, 1994). Responses range from 1) very much do not agree, 4) I 
have no strong opinion, to 7) very much agree. The tests measures if the participant 
thinks that certain people deserve more praise, opportunity, and advantage than others 
intrinsically (Pratto et al, 1994). Items are added, providing a single, total score.   
 The scale itself consists of questions such as “Increased economic equality is 
important to me”, a positive response to which would indicate support for hierarchy 
attenuation (Pratto et al, 1994). The scale has been thoroughly examined and validated 
with external measures of interpersonal aggression, scales of social darwinism, and 
endorsements of aggressive unilateral foreign policy, as well as being negatively 
correlated with scores on established empathy tests such as Super and Nevill’s Altruism 
scale (Super & Newill, 1985) and Davis’s Multidimensional Empathy Scale (Davis, 
1983), which are conceptually opposed to the SDO. Similar to the RWA scale, SDO has 
been validated cross culturally (Levin & Sidanius, 1999). The instrument itself has high 
internal reliability (α= .88) and strong test-retest reliability, .78 (Pratto et al., 1994).  The 
scale takes five minutes to complete, on average. 
Defining issues test. The Defining Issues Test (DIT) was developed by James 
Rest in the seventies to serve as a quantitative measure of the style of moral reasoning 
utilized by an individual. The test itself is fairly valid, with estimates of reliability 
ranging from .73 to .85 (Rest et al., 1986; Thoma, 2006). It consists of a set of five 
scenarios posing an ethical dilemma to the participant, who answers in the affirmative or 
negative to a question poised at the end, such as, “should Heinz steal the drug?” (Rest, 
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1979).  The participant is then presented with a series of “rationales” which could have 
been used in arriving at their conclusion. The primary concept behind the measure is that 
individuals will recognize the line of reasoning that they used better than they could 
recall the path of their cognitive process (Ericsson & Smith, 1991).  
Each of these items was ranked in degree of importance along a five point scale (1 
being not at all important, 3 being somewhat important, and 5 being very important). 
Each item is also keyed to a stage of moral development, vis a vis Kohlberg’s original 
theory-2 through 6.  Finally, the participant was asked to rank the top four rationales for 
their decision. The ratings that they provided for each individual rationale are scored 
depending on their rank in the “top four” category; these weighted values for each item 
are added across scenarios to provide a “value of principled morality”, or P. In the initial 
iteration of the test, the highest scoring value was the participants current stage of moral 
reasoning-so a participant who scored highest in stage 4 would be a stage 4 moral 
reasoner.  
 While a large amount of ancillary information can be harvested from the 
individual rankings of importance for items, for the purpose of this study they were used 
in their primary role as a consistency check-participants should have selected items they 
ranked highest for their top four; if they do not, they likely did not understand the 
instructions. There are other validity scales built into the form to detect self-
aggrandizement, but they are not particularly sensitive.  The importance of the rating 
system for each item is greater under the auspices of current DIT test usage (Rest et al., 
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1999c). Participants who show difficulty in properly selecting the most important items 
from their own ranking but who otherwise properly fill out the test form are now 
identified as being a stable population associated with the transitional schemas that exist 
between one moral reasoning schema and another (Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, & Thoma, 
1999b). 
While the DIT has been superseded by a revised version (the DIT-2), the original 
framework of the DIT remains viable and the data gathered with it can be integrated into 
the more modern ‘schema of moral reasoning’ model, which has supplanted the previous 
stage model (Bebeau & Thoma, 1999). By classifying scores into the seven types of 
schema categories outlined in Rest (1999), consolidated Pre-conventional, Conventional, 
and Post-Conventional, as well as their disorganized or ‘transitional’ counterparts, a 
stable system of classification exists which is compatible with current research using the 
DIT-2 (Walker et al., 2001). This organization was achieved by taking participants who 
scored majority scores (cutoff set at 30) in the 2 and 3 range on the DIT and collapsing 
them into a single category: a similar operation is carried out for all other schemas (Rest 
et al., 1999b). The disorganized categories are collated by adding together those 
participants who failed to reach the 30 point cutoff on any index.  A meta-analysis of 
over 40,000 DIT forms collected over a twenty year period demonstrated the consistency 
and validity of this seven type model (Rest et al, 1999). The Defining Issues Test takes a 
significant amount of time to complete: most participants finish within a window of 20 to 
45 minutes. 
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It should be noted that there was a newer version of the DIT currently available. 
The DIT-2 was developed and introduced by Rest (1999c) at the turn of the century as a 
replacement for the original DIT. The differences between these two forms are marginal, 
consisting mostly of cosmetic updates (the war in question is now in the Persian Gulf, not 
the bay of Tonkin) and renorming of the test on updated and stratified sampling. The DIT 
and DIT-2 are nearly as correlated as each forms test-retest value (.81), and agreement 
between forms comes to a very high .98 once age and education differences are factored 
in, as many of the retested individuals had aged significantly from the original test 
(Thoma, 2006). Finally, a new index of principled morality, N2, has been added to allow 
greater discrimination between scores for those at the highest levels of moral 
development. As the sample for this experiment consisted of college students of mostly 
younger age stratums who were measured using a schema model, this addition added 
nothing to the test for this experiment. Given the high correlation between scores and the 
high cost of the DIT-2, the original form was used; this did not adversely impact results. 
Demographic form. A simple demographic form was included to collect 
information about participant age, gender, level of education, and ethnicity. The entire 
form could completed in under a minute. 
Procedure 
A recruiting script was read in class and a web address for an online testing site 
provided so that participants can complete the forms at leisure, beginning with the 
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authoritarian scales and DIT, and finishing with the demographic form. Participants were 
provided with a debriefing sheet outlining both the purpose of the experiment as well as 
contact information for the Kelly Center on campus, the experimenter, and the 
experimenter’s advisor if there are any concerns or complaints-this was available online 
at the end of the survey.  
Initial Data Screening 
A total of 198 students completed the survey; however, 66 participants failed to 
properly complete the study. Their results were discarded if they a) provided incomplete 
data for any of the scales, b) showed a greater than 20 point difference on a split half 
comparison in scores on the RWA or SDO (indicative of random responding), or c) 
exceeded the validity scale cutoff scores for the DIT, including unlikely times of 
completion for the form (either less than a half hour or greater than 90 minutes). After 
these exclusionary criteria were applied, a normal distribution was achieved for P, and 
split half correlations for RWA and SDO reached the acceptable .75 level. The collated 
data was analyzed using multiple regression procedure to determine if there are 
differences between moral reasoning schemas established by DIT scores on the ratings 
gathered from the RWA and SDO forms. While a DA procedure was initially proposed, 
the resultant sample size precluded the use of this particular procedure. Regressions 
proved to be sufficient to produce meaningful findings, however, for each hypothesis.  
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Further, it was useful to run separate iterations for each gender. The difference in 
scoring that was expected for the SDO and RWA resulted in a different profile for men 
and women (Sidanius et al, 2006). A split file version of all the operations for hypothesis 
one and two were run in order to determine the relationship between authoritarianism and 
moral judgment by gender. 
Results 
As postulated in hypothesis one findings for this experiment were in basic 
agreement with McFarland (2010), demonstrating of correlation between SDO, RWA, 
and levels of P. A Pearson correlation demonstrated that RWA was negatively correlated 
with ratings of P, r (125) = -.19, p<.05. SDO was not significantly correlated with P, r 
(125) = .03, p>.05. The mean scores for RWA (M=89.52, SD=13.39) and SDO (M=48.2, 
SD=16.85) were in the average range for these inventories (Altemeyer, 1998; Pratto et al., 
1994). The sample’s P score (M=21.46, SD=7.55) showed a lower average value and 
restricted range, common with scores from the Midwest and South (Navarez et al., 2002).  
Scores for S4 (M=33.25, SD=8.4) and S23 (M=35.2, SD=8.3) also fit this conclusion. In 
sum, RWA and SDO were either not correlated with, or negatively correlated with P.   
 As outlined in hypothesis two, multiple regression analysis was used to determine 
if scores on the RWA or SDO (independently or in conjunction) predicted the moral 
schema of individuals (S23, S4, or S56-the schema that overlaps with P), particularly in 
relation to the S4 schema types. This was done using a backwards entry of the SDO and 
RWA into a regression model, with RWA entered first when predicting type S4 schema 
54 
 
 
 
and SDO entered first for type S23. It was expected that these correlations should be 
much stronger than those demonstrated by Mcfarland (2010a) as they much more directly 
address the manner in which the content of the DIT interacts with established measures of 
authoritarianism. Multiple regressions were chosen to capture the implied covariance 
which was expected to account for a degree of difference in scoring on the DIT that 
would otherwise be inaccessible. Backwards entry was used so as to start with a model 
that most closely resembled that used by McFarland (2010a), removing variables only if 
they did not prove useful. The SDO and RWA measure were related (.19), but otherwise 
represent separate constructs reflecting the two common variables in authoritarian theory; 
as such, they were acceptable for use in a multiple regression. 
Starting with P/S56, the initial model that included both SDO and RWA proved to 
be less useful than one that excluded SDO, as suggested by the lack of substantive 
correlation noted above. As such, the model used for P/S56 included RWA only, 
F(1,123)=4.37, p<.05. The slope for this variable model was significant, β=-.19, 
t(122)=2.09, p<.05, and predicted 3.4% of variance (Adjusted R2=.034).  For P/S56, only 
RWA was an effective predicting variable, and results indicated that the higher a 
participants RWA score, the lower their P/S56 score would be. 
Similarly, the predictive model for S4 which initially included RWA and SDO 
was set aside in favor of one that included SDO only, as RWA did not prove to be an 
effective predictor of S4, r(122)=.08, p>.05. The final best fit model was produced by 
SDO alone, F(1,120)=7.06, p<.01, and predicted 5.6% of variance (Adjusted R2=0.56). 
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The slope of this variable was significant, β=.24, t(119)= -2.66, p<.01. SDO was the only 
effective predictor of S4: the higher a participants SDO score the higher their total score 
for S4. 
Finally, the original regression model for S23, which included SDO and RWA, 
was superseded by one utilizing SDO as the only effective predictor for S23. RWA was 
essentially uncorrelated with S23, r(129)=.004, p>.05. The final selected, significant 
model for S23 (SDO only) was F(1,127)=5.08, p<.05, and predicted 3.8% of variance 
(Adjusted R2=.038). The slope of this variable was significant, β=-.20, t(126)= -2.25, 
p<.05. Interestingly, the higher ones SDO score, the lower their score total in S23. 
Hypothesis three consisted of replicating aspects of the two previous hypotheses, 
using split file analyses by gender to analyze genders independently after the overall total 
has been examined. This determined that the model of association between authoritarian 
personality and moral reasoning style changed based on participant gender: the gender of 
participants was found to have an impact on the relationship of RWA and SDO to P, S4, 
and S23. Males in the sample had higher mean P scores (M=22.52, SD=8.69), RWA 
scores (M=94.84, SD=16.27), and SDO scores (M=51.2632, SD=16.49) when compared 
to females. Female scores for P where close to male scores (M=21.06, SD=7.01); 
however, female scores on RWA (M=88.52, SD=10.92), and SDO (M=46.66, SD=16.69) 
were lower, fitting expectations. This determined that the association between 
authoritarian personality and moral reasoning style would likely change based on 
participant gender. 
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First, regressions were run for the two predictor variables (RWA and SDO) with 
P/S56. These variables were used in individual regressions in order to determine the 
effects of gender on each variable in isolation. The regression for males using RWA as a 
predictor produced a significant model F(1,38)=8.86, p<.01, and predicted 19.8% of 
variance (Adjusted R2=.198). The slope for RWA was significant, β=-.44, t(36)= -2.98, 
p<.01. However, RWA was not a significant predictor for females, F(1,85)=0.07, p>.05. 
The slope for RWA was non-significant, β=-.03, t(84)= -27, p>.05. In effect, RWA 
predicted lower P/S56 scores for men, but not for women.  
 In regards to SDO, males did not produce a significant model, F(1,38)=1.07, 
p>.05. The slope for SDO was non-significant, β=.17, t(36)= 1.04, p>.05. Females, 
likewise, did not produce a significant model, F(1,85)=0.5, p>.05. The slope for SDO 
was non-significant, β=-.07, t(84)= -.68, p>.05. As such, SDO was not useful for 
predicting scores on P/S56 for either gender. 
Next a similar procedure was conducted for S4 scoring. Male scores (M=34.22, 
SD=7.84) were notably higher than female scores (M=32.69, SD=8.68).  The regression 
for males using RWA as a predictor for S4 produced a non-significant model, 
F(1,38)=.35, p>.05. The slope for RWA was non-significant, β=-.06, t(36)= -2.98, p<.01. 
RWA was also not a significant predictor for females, F(1,85)=0.31, p>.05. The slope of 
RWA was non-significant, β=-.06, t(84)= .56, p>.05.  
For to SDO, males did not produce a significant model, F(1,38)=1.48, p>.05. The 
slope for SDO was non-significant, β=.01, t(37)= .6, p>.05. Females did, however, 
produce a significant model, F(1,85)=5.42, p<.05, predicting 6.4% of variance (Adjusted 
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R2=.062). The slope for SDO in this case was significant, β=.25, t(84)=2.38, p<.05. Thus, 
for males, SDO was not useful in prediction of scores in S4, but it did help in predicting 
female scores, with higher SDO scores predicting higher scoring on S4. 
Finally, S23 scoring was assessed with the same method. Male scores (M=33.54, 
SD=7.92) were lower than female scores (M=36.01, SD=8.43). The regression for males 
using RWA as a predictor for S4 produced a non-significant model F(1,38)=2.75, p>.05. 
The slope for RWA was nonsignificant, β=.26, t(37)=1.66, p>.05. RWA was not a 
significant predictor for females either, F(1,85)=1.42, p>.05. The slope for RWA was 
non-significant in this case, β=-.13, t(84)= -1.19, p>.05. RWA was, effectively, not useful 
in predicting scores in S23. 
In regards to SDO, males did not produce a significant model, F(1,38)=3.2, p>.05, 
though they trended towards significance and likely would have achieved it with proper 
sample size. The slope for SDO was non-significant, β=-.27, t(37)=-1.8, p>.05. Females 
also did not produce a significant model, F(1,84)=1.86, p>.05, with SDO producing a 
non-significant slope, β=-.15, t(83)=-1.36, p>.05. With a split file for gender, SDO, 
which significantly predicted scores for S23, was not useful for either gender. This is 
likely because of the fact that in splitting the sample, a lower number of participants were 
available for each statistical test. As both male and female tests trended towards 
significance, it can be assumed that with more participants, both would have been 
significant-males more so than females.   
Hypothesis four suggested that controlling for age differences will lead to 
stronger relationships between scores on the SDO and RWA in regards to P, S4, and S23.  
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Because age is a strong predictor for scores on all three of the scales being used (Duckitt 
et al., 2002; Rest et al., 1999b), controlling for its effects may provide important 
information about how the measures in this experiment will interact. As age was expected 
to be evenly distributed across scores for all tests (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009; Thoma, 2006), 
partial correlations were used to test the nature of the relationship. Partial correlations 
were conducted for P, S4, and S23 with both RWA and SDO. Initial bivariate 
correlations to P were r (125) = -.19, p<.05 for RWA and r (125) = .03, p>.05 for SDO-
RWA was correlated significantly, and SDO was not.  
Adjusted for age effects, P correlated significantly with RWA, r(119)=-.21, 
p<.05, a minor increase in correlation from -.19. Removing the age effects increased the 
strength of the correlation between P and RWA. SDO was unaffected by the removal of 
age, r(119)=.03, p>.05, and caused no change in correlation strength.  
Using data from the bivariate and partial correlations above, the effective slope 
for RWA and S4 was unaffected, r(119)=.08, p>.05, the exact same as it was without 
removing age effects. SDO and S4 (the only significant predictor) changed from .24 to 
.25, r(119)=.25, p<.01. Removing age effects increased the strength of the correlation 
very slightly.  
The correlation for RWA and S23 changed from .08 to .006, r(119)=.006, p>.05. 
This non-significant change means that removing age had little effect. SDO and S23 did 
not change: -.2 to -.2, r(119)=-.2, p<.05. Age had no effect at all in this case.  
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Hypothesis five used SDO and RWA to predict the forced choice items from the 
DIT.  For example, among high SDO scorers, the Mechanics Dilemma presents the story 
of an ethnic out group who was competent and capable attempting to close the social gap 
between himself and the protagonist via employment. This was the exact sort of threat 
that offends SDO sensibilities (Pratto et al, 1994). Thus, high scorers on this inventory 
were not expected to endorse hiring the mechanic, therefore symbolically maintaining 
Social Dominance.  In the case of high RWA scorers, the Doctors Dilemma and Heinz 
Dilemma scenarios were hypothesized to elicit a similar response. Both represent action 
being taken against the proper authorities, something very threatening to RWA 
individuals. These assumptions were tested using simple regressions, as data should be 
robust enough that it will not require dummy coding. All combinations of response for all 
six scenarios and two authoritarianism predictors were tested. Of these combinations, 
four were found to be significant. 
 RWA was found to have a negative effect on scenario four, the doctors dilemma, 
F(1, 120)=-6.48, p<.05. The slope was  β=-.27, t(123)=-2.55, p<.05. The model predicted 
7% of variance (Adjusted R2=.07). High RWA scorers more frequently indicated that the 
doctor should not administer an overdose.  
SDO was found to predict an increase in “yes” responses to scenarios one and 
four, indicating that Heinz should rob the chemist and the doctor should administer a 
lethal overdose. For the Heinz scenario (scenario one) the regression model was 
significant F(1, 120)=7.55, p<.01, with a significant slope of  β=.24, t(118)=2.75, p<.01. 
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The model predicted 5.9% of variance (Adjusted R2=.059). The Doctor scenario (scenario 
four) regression model was significant F(1, 122)=7.55, p<.01, with a significant slope of  
β=.24, t(120)=2.73, p<.01. The model predicted 5.6% of variance (Adjusted R2=.056).  
Scenario five, Webster, was negatively affected by SDO-that is, the higher the SDO 
score, the more likely participants were to indicate “no” that Webster should not hire a 
nonwhite mechanic. The regression model was significant F(1, 124)=9.77, p<.01, with a 
significant slope of  β=-.27, t(123)=-3.13, p<.01. The model predicted 7.3% of variance 
(Adjusted R2=.073).   
Finally, for Hypothesis six, scores of RWA were used to predict scores on the 
Anarchy (A) index. A simple Pearson correlation was used, but the findings were not 
significant, F(1, 119)=.05, p>.05. The slope was likewise not significant, β=.03, 
t(118)=.22, p>.05. SDO was also tested, resulting in an non-significant regression model: 
F(1, 119)=.66, p>.05. The slope was also not significant, β=.08, t(117)=.82, p>.05. That 
is, there was no meaningful relationship between scores for the Anarchy index and RWA 
or SDO. 
Discussion 
The data derived from this study is interesting for several reasons. Foremost, it 
deviates from McFarland (2010b), in that only ratings of RWA were significantly 
negatively correlated with P, though the expected strength (.25) was not far off of the 
resulting value found in this study. This called into question the validity of a 
RWA/SDO/DIT axis for predicting prejudice; however, possible reasons for this exist. In 
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regards to P, the difference from this study and McFarland’s model may likely be the 
result of sophisticated responders among high SDO scorers. For example, the majority 
(N=10, 71%) of those participants discarded for scoring above the cutoff of invalid 
responding for the DIT were above the mean on their SDO scores. The M, or invalid 
scale, for the DIT is designed to detect attempts at sounding righteous or morally 
highminded, but which are effectively meaningless responses that are unlikely to be 
endorsed by an actual responder.  
As such, it can be concluded that among this sample, a higher percentage of 
participants who produced elevated SDO scores attempted to provide higher moral 
reasoning scores than they would have if they were attempting to respond honestly. This 
may be a confounding variable introduced by the testing environment that reduced the 
likelihood and perception of culpability (Zimbardo, 1972), as this testing was 
administered in a differing manner than that conducted by pervious researchers who used 
an in class environment. This seems all the more likely, given that the arrangement of 
RWA scores was close to previous studies, indicating an otherwise valid data batch, 
rather than simple social desirability.  
It was expected that in addition to negative correlations with P, RWA and SDO 
would correlate positively with S4 and S23. The emphasis on conformity, social stability, 
and immutability of social structures (laws, hierarchies) which form the semantic core of 
conventional (S4) schema reasoning in the DIT are all core concepts of the Right Wing 
personality outlined by Altemeyer (1998). Likewise, the desire for static social structure 
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and application of law to enforce social roles present in S23 reasoning is easily wedded to 
Sindalus and Prattos conception of Social Dominance Orientation (Pratto et al., 1994). 
 Against expectations, RWA was not a predictive factor for either S4 or S23, 
though SDO was. It was expected that as RWA was negatively correlated with P in 
previous studies (McFarland, 2010a), it should align with the other schemas. 
Interestingly, while elevated SDO scores predicted higher scoring on S4, the reverse was 
true regarding S23, which was negatively correlated with SDO. There are several 
possible explanations for this interesting arrangement: the first is likely due to pre-
established characteristics of high authoritarian scorers, the other has to do with 
differences found as a result of gender.  
In examining the regression data, SDO demonstrates a very interesting and varied 
response to S4 and S23 schemas. S4 is positively correlated with SDO. This makes sense 
when examining the basic concept of social dominance. High SDO individuals utilize 
preexisting social structures to maintain authority and dominance (Sidanius et al., 2004); 
obviously they would ‘hitch their wagons’ to ideologically fixed perceptions of rule and 
order which are associated with S4, the “maintaining order” schema. The inverse 
relationship with S23 is likely a result of the lesser predictability associated with level 
two and three moral reasoning. Level two, which relies solely on getting what it is 
possible to get without punishment, and level three, which is keyed to personal 
relationships, was in retrospect obviously antithetical to any attempt to maintain order 
and control over responding of society. This is probably a result of the structure of the 
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DIT, which poses moral questions focused on other individuals-perhaps SDO scorers 
would respond differently if they were asked explicitly if they would steal the drug, 
rather than Heinz.  
RWA’s lack of relationship with S4 was curious, but not without explanation. The 
previously suspected one-to-one relationship between RWA and S4 may have been 
exaggerated. While S4 appears to pull directly from the same ideological base as RWA 
on the surface, it is entirely possible that they represent differing aspects of a similar 
concept. For example, S4 reasoning relies on questions that focus on the rule of law itself 
(Rest, 1978). RWA, by contrast, is more focused on “submission to a strong ruler” and 
“surrender of independent freedoms for safety” (Altemeyer, 1998). That is, RWA is more 
focused on concrete expressions of order-on the personal relationship between authority 
figures and subjects, between fear of harm and the creation of order at any cost.  
It is possible that the DIT’s focus on abstracted principles of law did not 
adequately tap into the emotionally biased content of RWA, and failed to elicit the 
expected reaction simply because it did not trigger the emotional, or fear response, so 
strongly associated with authoritarianism in both scientific literature and in political 
critiques (Altemeyer, 2006; Anagazi, 1980). In effect, the DIT is too emotionally flat to 
evoke the emotionally laden construct of Right Wing Authoritarianism. While some of 
the individual scenarios in the DIT may have triggered the emotional content of RWA 
(the student take over, etc), the overall measures used to generate S4 scores simply did 
not produce the response from RWA scorers that a more pathos laden form may have. If 
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a more personal alternative form could be constructed, or scenarios depicting social 
upheaval or moral choice options that indicated a more emotion laden reasoning could be 
used, the association between RWA and S4 would likely be very strong indeed. 
The relationship of RWA to S23 was perhaps the most interesting, as it was in 
fact the product of moderating influences. In running a split file computation, gender was 
found to be critically important in the lack of correlation found with RWA and S23. 
Males were in fact more likely to score high on S23 if they possessed higher RWA 
scores, whereas women were less likely to. These statements must be tempered by the 
lack of significance, but both findings trended towards significance-a more complete 
sample would have likely found them to be pertinent. This follows the rationale stated in 
Altemeyer’s latest revision of the authoritarian concept (2006) which indicated that high 
scoring males are more likely to endorse force, aggression, and violation of ‘the rules’ in 
order to enforce order (similar to S23), whereas women who score high are less likely to 
do so.  It should be noted that SDO demonstrated the same lack of significance due to 
low N (trended towards significance), and higher correlation values for men than women; 
however, both genders showed movement in the same direction. This is a common 
finding in most literature (Pratto et al, 1994, Sidanius, 2002). What is important is that 
this moderation of effect for RWA and S23 calls for an even more in depth analysis of 
the scores in regards to P and S4. 
In regards to gender effects, the relationship between P and authoritarian 
measures changed a good deal. This is a potentially interesting finding as research up to 
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this point with the SDO indicates both invariance, in the case of career outcomes, choice 
of college major, etc (Sidanius et al., 2006a), as well as pronounced gender effects which 
are common among political issues. The RWA does not demonstrate such interactive 
effects (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009). This represented a great opportunity for the DIT to help 
further elucidate the meaning of gender differences in scores for SDO, and to a lesser 
extent, RWA.  
 RWA showed a powerful relationship between RWA males and P and nearly 
none between females and P. As discussed above, this further outlines the possibility that 
authoritarian measures may be highly reactive to gender when applied to moral reasoning 
or other similar measures. SDO did not show a pattern of gender variance, being closely 
collinear for P. When applied to S4, female SDO scorers were found to significantly 
endorse S4 choices, though males did not (bearing in mind the smaller male sample, it is 
possible that an equally sized sample would have produced significant findings).  
Further, females had a stronger correlation than males, a reverse of the 
relationship for S23. This may again be an effect of aggression and antisocial behavior 
being more common in males, thus converging with the manner in which S23 moral 
choice responses are written (Sibley& Liu, 2010). The fact that SDO was a positive 
predictor for one gender but not the other in regards to S4 argues for a more complex 
method of integrating the DIT into predictive models of prejudice, especially in light of 
the relationship between RWA and S23. RWA was not significant for S4 regardless of 
gender split file operations-given the total lack of correlation between the two, this was 
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unlikely. Obviously the relationship between these two measures of authoritarianism and 
moral reasoning is more complex than previously postulated: methods for properly 
utilizing it within a predictive model will be discussed below. Before this, there are a few 
remaining hypotheses that need to be discussed. 
The effects of age were minimal, only increasing the strength of correlation 
between RWA and P, and nullifying it in relationship to RWA and S23. This is more than 
likely the result of the limited spread of age throughout the sample. Likewise, range 
constriction undermined the hypothesis that the anarchy index (A) of the DIT would be 
negatively correlated with RWA and SDO. Only a limited number of participants whose 
profiles turned out to be valid endorsed a large number of A responses. Because of this, 
no meaningful finding was made in this regard. 
This was not the case for hypothesis five, which predicted that ratings of 
authoritarianism would impact the actual decision made by participants in each scenario. 
Each of the significant findings will be discussed in order. Interestingly, and expectedly, 
high RWA scorers refused to endorse killing the woman in the doctor scenario. Likely, 
the more direct nature of an ipsative question forced the emotional content of scenario 
four to impact RWA scorers more than S4 itself did. Previous studies of seminary 
students did not find a significant effect for the doctor scenario, the fact that this study 
did is indicative of the soundness of such a concept (Wilton, 2005).   
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Other meaningful findings included the fact that high SDO scorers leaned the 
opposite way regarding the doctor scenario, indicating that they would be willing to kill 
the woman. This was likely a power relationship between the doctor and others coming 
into play. SDO scorers also stated that Heinz should rob the chemist, which is an 
interesting finding what seems to go counter to normal reasoning. It is entirely possible 
that the effects of perspective taking impacted this outcome, as participants assume that 
they are the more elevated class and therefore impute absolute right to Heinz actions 
(Sidanius, 1993; Sidanius et al., 2001). This conclusion was supported by the fact that 
many lower economic class participants who scored high in the original SDO norming 
study endorsed items that seemed counter intuitive, such as increased funding for 
government projects that benefitted them more than others (Pratto et al, 1994), resulting 
in a net gain for their group at the cost of others. Thus, such an action still maintains the 
drive to use the status quo to acquire resources for one’s own group at the expense of 
others-Heinz theft can be seen in a similar light. 
SDO scorers, finally, endorsed not hiring the racial minority mechanic in the 
Webster scenario, which is a classical use of a power position to maintain economic 
hegemony over others (Duckitt, 2001). The use of direct, forced choice questions opens 
up another avenue for measuring the effects of authoritarianism on choice making, and 
while beyond the scope of this work, could be a useful direction for future investigations 
on the subject, as the results provide a more directly relatable view of individual 
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information processing that is not mediated through constructs that do not necessarily 
translate into actual behavior (Rest, 1999, Walker, 2004).   
While P is a standard measure and it is encouraged that researchers nominally 
approach the variable as a scaled rather than categorical construct (Navaresz et al, 2000), 
Thoma (2006) indicated that it may be useful to view it as a representation of several 
schemas in certain cases. By applying this reasoning, this study found that significant 
variation in the distribution of scores for RWA and SDO exists “below” the range utilized 
by previous studies with the DIT. SDO, in particular, varies between S4 and S23 
schemas, and RWA demonstrated a range of effects based on the gender of the 
participant.  
Obviously, the multiplicity of variance that can be pulled out from a detailed 
examination of the relationship between SDO, RWA, and the results of the DIT indicate 
that a much more specific and well defined use of each of the tests must be arrived at 
before they can be accurately used to predict any sort of behavior or ideation. Both the 
variance of the authoritarian scales prediction of each schema, as well as the unexpected 
gender effects, seems to imply that a blunt use of the scales is countermanded. It would 
likely be more useful to mediate the influences of each scale through scoring for the 
components of the DIT that they are significantly correlated with-for example, RWA 
should be mediated through scores of P, while the same could be done with SDO and S4 
and S23.  
69 
 
 
 
In this way, a stronger pathway between measures of authoritarianism and the 
DIT can be established, increasing predictive value for the entire model. By expanding 
the interaction between the DIT and authoritarian measures to include S4 and S23, as 
well as P, more variance can be picked up and utilized, rather than cast off as useless. It is 
very likely that S4 and S23 would correlate with prejudice and other similar constructs 
(Thoma, et al., 2009). This would allow for more data to be used in predictions, instead 
of it being lost, increasing the efficiency of the structural model being used for 
predictions.  
Likewise, due to the gender effects both in this study and in regards to 
authoritarian scales, it may also be useful to split samples much like what was done in 
this study in order to achieve an even finer grain on the true relationship between 
measures and attitudes. In particular, the relationship between female participants’ score 
profiles and those produced by male participants needs to be illuminated. Perhaps the 
entire model used by McFarland could benefit from splitting genders due to the number 
of differences in how these scales interact with gender. 
In so doing, the degree to which the DIT can predict and be used to mediate 
effects can be expanded, by bifurcating data into multiple streams instead of a single, 
awkward construct that fails to capture the multiplicity of effects that authoritarianism 
has on moral reasoning. A fully expanded model would have each variable fed though the 
schema that it shows correlation with, and include parallel models for both males and 
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females. The total gain would likely outstrip the previous incarnation, and could be 
overlapped with other variables such as empathy and hard mindedness.  
Fig. 1. Proposed Prejudice Model 
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Also, in detecting differences in the way that moral reasoning interacts with 
differing forms of authoritarianism, it is possible that the nature of the construct of moral 
reasoning might be further illuminated. For example, the lack of correlation between 
RWA and S4 raises the question as to how the constructs are defined, and the accuracy of 
their definitions. Thoma (2006) describes S4 as a tendency to uphold traditions, maintain 
order, and follow established rules-strikingly similar to Altemeyers (2006) description of 
RWA as a tendency to conservate socially and give authority to leaders in order to 
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maintain order. While these definitions appear to be quite similar, the lack of correlation 
between measures may lead to the question of either the accuracy of the tests or the 
definition of what they measure. Further investigation is warranted, regardless.   
In summary, this study demonstrates the complex nature of authoritarianism and 
moral schema scoring on the DIT, and opens up many avenues for future research, 
including using the RWA/SDO/DIT components in defining authoritarian ideology, but 
also in the relationship between these components and their parent concepts of authority 
and morality.  
Limitations 
There are several important limitations for this study. First of all, a good deal of 
data had to be discarded due to the nature of the administration, which lent itself to 
random responding for some participants. It may be useful, from an administrative 
perspective, to modify online testing procedures so that only valid profiles count towards 
extra credit or other rewards: the manner of doing so is beyond the purview of this work, 
but is worth consideration for other future experimenters. This reduced the sample size 
significantly, though not to a degree that rendered statistical procedures unable to 
adequately detect differences. Several regressions, such as the gender by RWA 
regressions for S23 may have been significant with a larger sample, and the overall 
power of findings could have been increased.  
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Further, the age range of this study was relatively constricted; it would have been 
beneficial to have expanded the sample to include a broader populations. Likewise, the 
DIT is heavily impacted by education level-by limiting the sample to college students, a 
degree of range restriction was likely spuriously introduced to the results; however, 
college students have most often been the subject of testing involving both the DIT (Rest 
et al, 1999) and most authoritarian measures (Pratto et al, 1994). As such, this may not be 
so much a limitation as a necessary protocol in order to allow data to be comparable with 
the general pool of studies available.  
The final major concern relates to the DIT as an obsolete form. The newer 
version-the DIT-2-while strongly correlated with the original form, does represent a 
major step forward in refreshing the test and making it cogent for current students. It is 
possible that the use of more modern forms may change the scoring to a minor degree, 
changing the end results of the study. 
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CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH   
Department of Psychology, Fort Hays State University 
 
Study title: The effects of authoritarianism on moral schema development and usage 
 
Name of Researchers  Clinton Luth: 308-390-1165 or cmluth@mail.fhsu.edu 
Name of Faculty Supervisor & Contact Information: Dr. Janett Naylor, jmnaylor@fhsu.edu 785.628.4405 
 
You are being asked to participate in a research study.  It is your choice whether or not to participate.  
Your decision whether or not to participate will have no effect on your standing with the Department of 
Psychology or Fort Hays State University.  Please ask questions if there is anything you do not understand. 
 
What is the purpose of this study ?  The purpose of this study is to expand upon the existing knowledge regarding 
how moral reasoning interacts with certain social opinions. This experiment will use three short surveys to collect data 
on your opinions regarding social issues as well as examining your style of moral reasoning via a short test. A 
demographic form is also attached to allow us to further clarify findings. 
 
What does this study involve ?  If you agree to participate, you will be asked to complete surveys designed 
to measure your answers to moral situations, personal opinions on social issues, and basic demographic 
information. If you decide to participate in this research study, you will be asked to sign this consent form 
after you have had all your questions answered and understand what will happen to you. The length of time 
of your participation is 35 minutes. Approximately 300 participants will be in this study. 
 
Are there any benefits from participating in this study ?  As participants, you will be able to learn about 
your personal level of moral reasoning by confronting several hypothetical situations.  Likewise, you will be 
helping to further refine our understanding of the long range effects that changes in early family structure 
have on later life development.  
 
Will you be paid or receive anything to participate in this study ?  Extra credit may be offered by your 
instructor. 
 
What are the risks involved with being enrolled in this study ?  It is unlikely that participation in this 
project will result in harm to you. Sometimes talking about these subjects can cause people to become upset. 
You do not have to talk about any subjects you do not want to talk about, and you may stop participating at 
any time. If you feel distressed or become upset by participating contact the Kelly Center, the Psychology 
Department Ethics Chair, or the course instructor. This contact information will be provided for you at the 
end of the experiment, or at any time that you request. Also, the experimenter will be able to provide 
directions and offer assistance if necessary.  
 
Your information will not be linked to you in any way.  The surveys will be numbered with an ID number for data 
collection purposes only.  The consent forms with your name will be kept separate from the surveys.  Your 
confidentiality will be protected by not linking names with information and keeping the forms entirely separate. All 
forms will be destroyed after the experiment is fully completed and all presentations with the data have concluded. 
 
How will your privacy be protected?  Potentially identifiable information about you will consist of surveys 
and signed consent documents.  Data are collected only for research purposes and your data will be identified 
by ID number, not name.  All information will be stored separately in a locked file cabinet. All surveys and 
consents will be kept in locked files and these files will be shredded at the end of the fall 2013 semester. 
Electronic and de-identified records will be kept in a locked file for up to 5 years or until the study ends and 
will be destroyed at that time. Access to all data will be limited to the researchers listed above.  The 
information collected for this study will be used only for the purposes of conducting this study. What we find 
from this study may be presented at meetings or published in papers but your name will not ever be used in 
these presentations or papers.  Data will only be presented in aggregate form in any publication or 
presentation. 
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Other important items you should know:  
• Withdrawal from the study:  You may choose to stop your participation in this study at any time. Your 
decision to stop your participation will have no effect on your academic standing within this course, the 
Department of Psychology or Fort Hays State University. 
• Funding: There is no outside funding for this research project. 
 
Whom should you call with questions about this study ?  Questions about this study may be directed to the 
Ethics Chairperson in Psychology:  Dr. Janett Naylor at jmnaylor@fhsu.edu.  If you have questions, 
concerns, or suggestions about human research at FHSU, you may call the Office of Scholarship and 
Sponsored Projects at FHSU (785) 628-4349 during normal business hours. 
 
CONSENT 
I have read the above information about The effects of authoritarianism on moral schema development and 
usage and have been given an opportunity to ask questions. By signing this I agree to participate in this study 
and I have been given a copy of this signed consent document for my own records. I understand that I can 
change my mind and withdraw my consent at any time. By signing this consent form I understand that I am 
not giving up any legal rights. I am 18 years or older. 
 
       
Participant's Signature and Date  
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Opinions about social problems 
This questionnaire is aimed at understanding how people think about social problems. Different people often have 
different opinions about questions of right and wrong. There are no “Right” answers in the way that there are right 
answers to math problems. We would like you to tell us what you think about several problem stories. The papers will 
be fed to a computer to find the average for the whole group, and no one will see your individual answers. 
In this questionnaire you will be asked to give your opinions about several stories. Here is a story as an example. 
Frank Jones has been thinking about buying a car. He is married, has two small children and earns an average income. 
The car he buys will be his family’s only car. It will be used mostly to get to work and drive around town, but 
sometimes for vacation trips also. In trying to decide what car to buy, Frank Jones realized that there are a lot of 
questions to consider. Below there is a list of some of these questions. 
If you were Frank Jones, how important would each of these questions be in deciding what car to buy? 
Instructions for Part A: (Sample Question) 
On the left hands side check one of the spaces by each statement of a consideration. (For instance, if you think that 
statement #1 is not important in making a decision about buying a car, check on the right.) 
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IMPORTANCE: 
great much Some Little no  
    X 1. Whether the car dealer was in the same block as where Frank 
Lives. (Note that in this sample, the person taking the questionnaire 
did not think this was important in making a decision.) 
X     2. Would a used car be more economical in the long run than a new 
car? (Note that a check was put in the far left space to indicate the 
opinion that this is an important issue in making a decision about 
buying a car.) 
  X   3. Whether the color was green, Frank’s favorite color. 
    X 4. Whether the cubic inch displacement was at least 200. (Note that 
if you are unsure about what “cubic inch displacement” means then 
mark it “No importance”.) 
X     5. Would a large, roomy car be better than a compact car? 
    X 6. Whether the front connibilies were differential. (Note that if a 
statement sounds like gibberish or nonsense to you, mark it “no 
importance.”)  
 
Instructions for part B: (Sample Questions) 
From the list of questions above, select the most important one of the whole group. Put the number of the most 
important question on the top line below. Do likewise for your 2nd, 3rd, and 4th most important choices. (Note that the 
top choices in this case will come from the statements that were checked on the far left hand side—statements #2 and 
#5 were thought to be very important. In deciding what is the most important, a person would re-read #2 and #5, and 
then pick one of them as the most important, then put the other one as “second most important,” and so on.) 
Most   Second most important  Third most important   Fourth most important  
  5      2      3    1    
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Heinz and the drug 
In Europe a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought might 
save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to 
make, but the druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost to make. He paid $200 for the radium and charged 
$2000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman’s husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, 
but he could only get together about $1000, which is half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying, 
and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the Druggist said, “No, I discovered the drug and I’m going to 
make money from it.” So Heinz got desperate and began to think about breaking into the man’s store to steal the drug 
for his wife. 
Should Heinz steal the drug? (Check one) 
__Should steal it   __Can’t decide   __Should not steal it 
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IMPORTANCE: 
Great Much Some Little No  
     1. Whether a community’s laws are going to be upheld. 
     2. Isn’t it only natural for a loving husband to care so much for his 
wife that he’d steal? 
     3. Is Heinz willing to risk getting shot as a burglar or going to jail 
for the chance that stealing the drug might help? 
     4. Whether Heinz is a professional wrestler, or has considerable 
influence with professional wrestlers. 
     5. Whether Heinz is stealing for himself or doing this solely to help 
someone else. 
     6.  Whether the druggist’s rights to his invention have to be 
respected. 
     7. Whether the essence of living is more encompassing than the 
termination of dying, social and individually. 
     8. What values are going to be the basis for governing how people 
act towards each other?  
     9. Whether the druggist is going to be allowed to hide behind a 
worthless law which only protects the rich anyhow. 
     10. Whether the law in this case is getting in the way of the most 
basic claim of any member of society. 
     11. Whether the druggist deserves to be robbed for being so greedy 
and cruel. 
     12. Would stealing in such a case bring about more total good for the 
whole society or not. 
 
From the list of questions above, select the four most important:       __ Most important 
            __ Second most important 
            __ Third most important 
            __ Fourth most important 
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Student take-over 
At Harvard university  group of students, called the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), believe that the 
University should not have an army ROTC program. SDS students are against the war in Vietnam, and the army 
training program helps send men to fight in Vietnam. The SDS students demanded that Harvard end the army ROTC 
training programs as a university course. This would mean that Harvard students could not get army training as part of 
their regular course work and not get credit for it towards their degrees.  
Agreeing with the SDS students, the Harvard professors voted to end the ROTC as a university course. But the 
president of the University state that he wanted to keep the program on campus as a course. The SDS students felt that 
the president was not going to pay attention to the faculty vote or to their demands.  
So, one day last April, two hundred SDS students walked into the universities administration building, and told 
everyone to get out. They said they were doing this to force Harvard to get rid of the army training program as a course. 
Should the students have taken over the administration building? (Check one) 
__Yes, they should take it over __Can’t decide   __No, they shouldn’t take it over 
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IMPORTANCE: 
Great Much Some Little No  
     1. Are the students doing this to really help other people or are they 
doing it just for kicks? 
     2. Do the students have any right to take over property that doesn’t 
belong to them? 
     3. Do the students realize that they might be arrested and fined, and 
even expelled from school? 
     4. Would taking over the building in the long run benefit more 
people to a greater extent? 
     5. Whether the president stayed within the limits of his authority in 
ignoring the faculty vote. 
     6. Will the takeover anger the public and give all students a bad 
name? 
     7. Is taking over a building consistent with principles of justice? 
     8. Would allowing one student take-over encourage many other 
student take-overs? 
     9. Did the president bring this misunderstanding on himself by being 
so unreasonable and uncooperative? 
     10. Whether running the university ought to be in the hands of a few 
administrators or in the hands of all the people. 
     11. Are the students following principles when they believe they are 
above the law? 
     12. Whether or not university decisions ought to be respected by 
students or not. 
 
From the list of questions above, select the four most important:      __ Most important 
            __ Second most important 
            __ Third most important 
            __ Fourth most important 
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Escaped Prisoner 
A man has been sentenced to prison for 10 years. After one year, however, he escaped from prison, moved to a new 
area of the country, and took on the name of Thompson. For eight years he worked hard, and gradually he saved 
enough money to buy his own business. He was fair to his customers, gave his employees top wages, and gave most of 
his profits to charity. Then one day, Mrs. Jones, an old neighbor, recognized him as the man who had escaped from 
prison 8 years before, and whom the police had been looking for. 
Should Mrs. Jones report Mr. Thompson to the police and have him sent back to prison? (Check one) 
__Should report him  __Can’t decide   __should not report him 
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IMPORTANCE: 
Great Much Some Little No  
     1. Hasn’t Mr. Thompson been good enough for such a long time to 
prove he isn’t a bad person? 
     2. Every time someone escapes punishment for a crime, doesn’t that 
just encourage more crime? 
     3. Wouldn’t we be better off without prisons and the oppressions of 
our legal systems? 
     4. Has Mr. Thompson really paid his debt to society? 
     5. Would society be failing what Mr. Thompson should fairly 
expect? 
     6. What benefits would prisons be apart from society, especially for 
a charitable man? 
     7. How could anyone be so cruel and heartless as to send Mr. 
Thompson to prison? 
     8. Would it be fair to all the prisoners who had to serve out their full 
sentences if Mr. Thompson was let off? 
     9. Was Mrs. Jones a good friend of Mr. Thompson? 
     10. Wouldn’t it be a citizen’s duty to report an escaped criminal, 
regardless of the circumstances? 
     11. How would the will of the people and the public good best be 
served? 
     12. Would going to prison do any good for Mr. Thompson or protect 
anybody? 
From the list of questions above, select the four most important:       __ Most important 
            __ Second most important 
            __ Third most important 
            __ Fourth most important 
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The Doctors Dilemma 
A lady was dying of cancer which could not be cured and she had only about six months to live. She was in terrible 
pain, but she was so weak that a good dose of pain-killer like morphine would make her die sooner. She was delirious 
and almost crazy with pain, and in her calm periods, she would ask the doctor to give her enough morphine to kill her. 
She said she couldn’t stand the pain and that she was going to die in a few months anyway. 
What should the doctor do? (Check one) 
__He should give the lady an overdose that will make her die 
 __Can’t decide  
__Should not give the overdose 
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IMPORTANCE: 
Great Much Some Little No  
     1. Whether the woman’s family is in favor of giving her the 
overdose or not. 
     2. Is the doctor obligated by the same laws as everybody else if 
giving her an overdose would be the same as killing her? 
     3. Whether people would be much better off without society 
regimenting their lives and even their deaths. 
     4. Whether the doctor could make it appear like an accident. 
     5. Does the state have the right to force continued existence on 
those who don’t want to live? 
     6. What is the value of death prior to society’s perspective on 
personal values? 
     7. Whether the doctor has sympathy for the woman’s suffering of 
cares more about what society might think. 
     8. Is helping to end another’s life ever a responsible act of 
cooperation? 
     9. Whether only God should decide when a person’s life should 
end. 
     10. What values the doctor has set for himself in his own personal 
code of behavior. 
     11.  Can society afford to let everybody end their lives when they 
want to? 
     12. Can society allow suicides or mercy killing and still protect the 
lives of individuals who want to live. 
 
From the list of questions above, select the four most important:      __ Most important 
   __ Second most important          __ Third most important          __ Fourth most important 
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Webster 
Mr. Webster was the owner and manager of a gas station. He wanted to hire another mechanic to help him, but good 
mechanics are hard to find. The only person he found who seemed to be a good mechanic was Mr. Lee, but he was 
Chinese. While Mr. Webster himself didn’t have anything against Orientals, he was afraid to hire Mr. Lee because 
many of his customers didn’t like Orientals. His customers might take their business elsewhere if Mr. Lee was working 
in the gas station. 
When Mr. Lee asked Mr. Webster if he could have the job, Mr. Webster said that he had already hired someone else. 
But Mr. Webster really had not hired anybody, because he could not find anybody who was a good mechanic besides 
Mr. Lee. 
What should Mr. Webster have done? (Check one) 
__Should have hired Mr. Lee  __Can’t decide  __Should not have hired him 
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IMPORTANCE: 
Great Much Some Little No  
     1. Does the owner of a business have the right to make his own 
business decisions or not? 
     2. Whether there is a law that forbids racial discrimination in hiring 
for jobs. 
     3. Whether Mr. Webster is prejudiced against Orientals himself or 
whether he means nothing personal in refusing the job. 
     4. Whether hiring a good mechanic or paying attention to his 
customer’s wishes would be best for his business. 
     5. What individual differences ought to be relevant in deciding how 
society’s roles are filled? 
     6. Whether the greedy and competitive capitalistic system ought to 
be completely abandoned. 
     7. Do a majority of people in Mr. Webster’s society feel like his 
customers or is a majority against prejudice? 
     8. Whether hiring capable men like Mr. Lee would use talents that 
would otherwise be lost to society. 
     9. Would refusing the job to Mr. Lee be consistent with Mr. 
Webster’s own moral beliefs? 
     10. Could Mr. Webster be so hard-hearted as to refuse the job, 
knowing how much it means to Mr. Lee? 
     11. Whether the Christian commandment to love your fellow man 
applies in this case. 
     12. If someone’s in need, shouldn’t he be helped regardless of what 
you get back from him? 
From the list of questions above, select the four most important:      __ Most important 
  __ Second most important                __ Third most important                 __ Fourth most important 
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Newspaper 
Fred, a senior in high school, wanted to publish a mimeographed newspaper for students so that he could express many 
of his opinions. He wanted to speak out against the war in Vietnam and to speak out against some of the school’s rules, 
like the rule forbidding boys to wear long hair. When Fred started his newspaper, he asked his principal for permission. 
The principal said it would be all right if before every publication Fred would turn in all his articles for the principal’s 
approval. Fred agreed and turned in several articles for approval. The principal approved all of them and Fred published 
two issues of the paper in the next two weeks. But the principal had not expected that Fred’s newspaper would receive 
so much attention. Students were so excited by the paper that they began to organize protests against the hair regulation 
and other school rules. Angry parents objected to Fred’s opinions. They phoned the principal telling him that the 
newspaper was unpatriotic and should not be published. As a result of the rising excitement, the principal ordered Fred 
to stop publishing. He gave as a reason that Fred’s activities were disruptive to the operation of the school.  
Should the principal stop the newspaper? (Check one) 
__Should stop it   __Can’t decide   __Should not stop it 
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IMPORTANCE: 
Great Much Some Little No  
     1. Is the principal more responsible to students or to the parents? 
     2. Did the principal give his word that the newspaper could be 
published for a long time, or did he just promise to approve the 
newspaper one issue at a time? 
     3. Would the students start protesting even more if the principal 
stopped the newspaper? 
     4. When the welfare of the school is threatened, does the principal 
have the right to give orders to students? 
     5. Does the principal have the freedom of speech to say “No” in 
this case? 
     6. If the principal stopped the newspaper would he be preventing 
full discussion of important problems? 
     7. Whether the principal’s order would make Fred lose faith in the 
principal. 
     8. Whether Fred is really loyal to his school and patriotic to his 
country. 
     9. What effect would stopping the paper have on the students 
education in critical thinking and judgments? 
     10. Whether Fred was in any way violating the rights of others in 
publishing his own opinions. 
     11. Whether the principal should be influenced by some angry 
parents when it is the principal that knows best what is going on in 
the school. 
     12. Whether Fred was using the newspaper to stir up hatred and 
discontent. 
From the list of questions above, select the four most important:     __ Most important 
  __ Second most important     __ Third most important     __ Fourth most important 
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Appendix C 
Right Wing Authoritarianism Scale 
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This survey is part of an investigation of general public opinion concerning a variety of 
social issues. You will probably find that you agree with some of the statements, and 
disagree with others, to varying extents. Please indicate your reaction to each statement 
on the line to the left of each item according to the following scale: 
 
1…………2…………3…………4…………5…………6…………7…………8 
Strongly disagree          neutral   Strongly agree 
 
___ 1. The established authorities generally turn out to be right about things, while the 
radicals and protestors are usually just “loud mouths” showing off their ignorance. 
1…………2…………3…………4…………5…………6…………7…………8 
Strongly disagree          neutral   Strongly agree 
 
___ 2. Women should have to promise to obey their husbands when they get married. 
1…………2…………3…………4…………5…………6…………7…………8 
Strongly disagree          neutral   Strongly agree 
 
___ 3. Our country desperately needs a mighty leader who will do what has to be done to 
destroy the radical new ways and sinfulness that are ruining us. 
1…………2…………3…………4…………5…………6…………7…………8 
Strongly disagree          neutral   Strongly agree 
 
___ 4. Gays and lesbians are just as healthy and moral as anybody else. 
1…………2…………3…………4…………5…………6…………7…………8 
Strongly disagree          neutral   Strongly agree 
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___ 5. It is always better to trust the judgment of the proper authorities in government 
and religion than to listen to the noisy rabble-rousers in our society who are trying to 
create doubt in people’s minds 
1…………2…………3…………4…………5…………6…………7…………8 
Strongly disagree          neutral   Strongly agree 
 
___ 6. Atheists and others who have rebelled against the established religions are no 
doubt every bit as good and virtuous as those who attend church regularly. 
1…………2…………3…………4…………5…………6…………7…………8 
Strongly disagree          neutral   Strongly agree 
 
___ 7. The only way our country can get through the crisis ahead is to get back to our 
traditional values, put some tough leaders in power, and silence the troublemakers 
spreading bad ideas. 
1…………2…………3…………4…………5…………6…………7…………8 
Strongly disagree          neutral   Strongly agree 
 
___ 8. There is absolutely nothing wrong with nudist camps. 
1…………2…………3…………4…………5…………6…………7…………8 
Strongly disagree          neutral   Strongly agree 
 
___ 9. Our country needs free thinkers who have the courage to defy traditional ways, 
even if this upsets many people. 
1…………2…………3…………4…………5…………6…………7…………8 
Strongly disagree          neutral   Strongly agree 
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___ 10. Our country will be destroyed someday if we do not smash the perversions eating 
away at our moral fiber and traditional beliefs. 
1…………2…………3…………4…………5…………6…………7…………8 
Strongly disagree          neutral   Strongly agree 
 
___ 11. Everyone should have their own lifestyle, religious beliefs, and sexual 
preferences, even if it makes them different from everyone else. 
1…………2…………3…………4…………5…………6…………7…………8 
Strongly disagree          neutral   Strongly agree 
 
___ 12. The “old-fashioned ways” and the “old-fashioned values” still show the best way 
to live. 
1…………2…………3…………4…………5…………6…………7…………8 
Strongly disagree          neutral   Strongly agree 
 
___ 13. You have to admire those who challenged the law and the majority’s view by 
protesting for women’s abortion rights, for animal rights, or to abolish school prayer. 
1…………2…………3…………4…………5…………6…………7…………8 
Strongly disagree          neutral   Strongly agree 
 
___ 14. What our country really needs is a strong, determined leader who will crush evil, 
and take us back to our true path. 
1…………2…………3…………4…………5…………6…………7…………8 
Strongly disagree          neutral   Strongly agree 
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___ 15. Some of the best people in our country are those who are challenging our 
government, criticizing religion, and ignoring the “normal way things are supposed to be 
done.” 
1…………2…………3…………4…………5…………6…………7…………8 
Strongly disagree          neutral   Strongly agree 
 
___ 16. God’s laws about abortion, pornography and marriage must be strictly followed 
before it is too late, and those who break them must be strongly punished. 
1…………2…………3…………4…………5…………6…………7…………8 
Strongly disagree          neutral   Strongly agree 
 
___ 17. There are many radical, immoral people in our country today, who are trying to 
ruin it for their own godless purposes, whom the authorities should put out of action. 
1…………2…………3…………4…………5…………6…………7…………8 
Strongly disagree          neutral   Strongly agree 
 
___ 18. A “woman’s place” should be wherever she wants to be. The days when women 
are submissive to their husbands and social conventions belong strictly in the past. 
1…………2…………3…………4…………5…………6…………7…………8 
Strongly disagree          neutral   Strongly agree 
___ 19. Our country will be great if we honor the ways of our forefathers, do what the 
authorities tell us to do, and get rid of the “rotten apples” who are ruining everything. 
1…………2…………3…………4…………5…………6…………7…………8 
Strongly disagree          neutral   Strongly agree 
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___ 20. There is no “ONE right way” to live life; everybody has to create their own way. 
1…………2…………3…………4…………5…………6…………7…………8 
Strongly disagree          neutral   Strongly agree 
 
___ 21. Homosexuals and feminists should be praised for being brave enough to defy 
“traditional” family values. 
1…………2…………3…………4…………5…………6…………7…………8 
Strongly disagree          neutral   Strongly agree 
 
___ 22. This country would work a lot better if certain groups of troublemakers would 
just shut up and accept their group’s traditional place in society. 
1…………2…………3…………4…………5…………6…………7…………8 
Strongly disagree          neutral   Strongly agree 
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Appendix D 
Social Dominance Orientation-6 
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Which of the following objects or statements do you have a positive or negative feeling 
towards? Beside each object or statement, place a number from' 1' to '7' which represents 
the degree of your positive or negative feeling." The scale was labeled very positive (7), 
positive (6), slightly positive (5), neither positive nor negative (4), slightly negative (3), 
negative (2), and very negative (1). 
1…………….……..2…………….……..3……………….…..4……………….…..5…………….……..6……………….…..7 
Very negative    neither positive or negative    Very positive 
 
1. Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups. __ 
1…………….……..2…………….……..3……………….…..4……………….…..5…………….……..6……………….…..7 
Very negative    neither positive or negative    Very positive 
 
2. In getting what you want, it is sometimes necessary to use force against other groups. __ 
1…………….……..2…………….……..3……………….…..4……………….…..5…………….……..6……………….…..7 
Very negative    neither positive or negative    Very positive 
 
3. It’s OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others. __  
1…………….……..2…………….……..3……………….…..4……………….…..5…………….……..6……………….…..7 
Very negative    neither positive or negative    Very positive 
 
4. To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups. __  
1…………….……..2…………….……..3……………….…..4……………….…..5…………….……..6……………….…..7 
Very negative    neither positive or negative    Very positive 
 
5. If certain people stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems. __ 
1…………….……..2…………….……..3……………….…..4……………….…..5…………….……..6……………….…..7 
Very negative    neither positive or negative    Very positive 
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6. It’s probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the bottom. __ 
1…………….……..2…………….……..3……………….…..4……………….…..5…………….……..6……………….…..7 
Very negative    neither positive or negative    Very positive 
 
7. Inferior groups should stay in their place. __ 
1…………….……..2…………….……..3……………….…..4……………….…..5…………….……..6……………….…..7 
Very negative    neither positive or negative    Very positive 
 
8. Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place. __ 
1…………….……..2…………….……..3……………….…..4……………….…..5…………….……..6……………….…..7 
Very negative    neither positive or negative    Very positive 
 
9. It would be good if groups could be equal. __ 
1…………….……..2…………….……..3……………….…..4……………….…..5…………….……..6……………….…..7 
Very negative    neither positive or negative    Very positive 
 
10. Group equality should be our ideal. __ 
1…………….……..2…………….……..3……………….…..4……………….…..5…………….……..6……………….…..7 
Very negative    neither positive or negative    Very positive 
 
11. All groups should be given an equal chance in life. __ 
1…………….……..2…………….……..3……………….…..4……………….…..5…………….……..6……………….…..7 
Very negative    neither positive or negative    Very positive 
 
12. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups. __ 
1…………….……..2…………….……..3……………….…..4……………….…..5…………….……..6……………….…..7 
Very negative    neither positive or negative    Very positive 
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13. Increased Social Equality__ 
1…………….……..2…………….……..3……………….…..4……………….…..5…………….……..6……………….…..7 
Very negative    neither positive or negative    Very positive 
 
14. We would have fewer problems if we treated people more equally. __ 
1…………….……..2…………….……..3……………….…..4……………….…..5…………….……..6……………….…..7 
Very negative    neither positive or negative    Very positive 
 
15. We should strive to make incomes as equal as possible.__ 
1…………….……..2…………….……..3……………….…..4……………….…..5…………….……..6……………….…..7 
Very negative    neither positive or negative    Very positive 
 
16. No one group should dominate in society.__ 
1…………….……..2…………….……..3……………….…..4……………….…..5…………….……..6……………….…..7 
Very negative    neither positive or negative    Very positive 
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Appendix E 
Demographic Form 
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Demographic form 
 
Student Information 
 
Age:__ 
 
Gender:     M      F 
 
Class standing: (please check the appropriate item) 
KAM__ 
Freshman__ 
Sophomore__ 
Juinor__ 
Senior__ 
Graduate__ 
 
Race/ethnicity:  (please check the appropriate item) 
Asian/Pacific Islander__   
Black/African American __    
Hispanic/Latino__   
Native American__  
White/Caucasian_ 
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Appendix F 
Debriefing Form 
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Study title: The effects of authoritarianism on moral schema development and usage 
 
The purpose of this study was to expand upon the existing knowledge regarding how 
moral reasoning interacts with certain social opinions. This experiment used three short 
surveys to collect data on your opinions regarding social issues as well as examining your 
style of moral reasoning via a short test. A demographic form was also attached to allow 
us to further clarify findings. There are no right or wrong answers to any of these 
questions, and any responses you provide will be anonymous. 
 
 
If after participating in this student project you are feeling distressed from any 
questions on the surveys the following resource can offer you professional support 
and counseling. Also, feel free to ask any questions or express any concerns that you 
have to the experimenter. They will be happy to provide you with any resources you 
need if you have any concerns or complaints. 
 
Kelly Center (free of charge to students) 
Picken Hall Room 117 
785.628.4401 
 
If you have any questions about this student project or your rights as a participant 
in this student project, please contact: 
 
 
Dr. Janett Naylor 
Chair, Ethics Committee 
jmnaylor@fhsu.edu 
785.628.4405 
 
Clinton Luth 
Student  
cmluth@Mail.fhsu.edu 
308.390.1165 
 
 
